Preliminary Report on Race and Washington’s
Criminal Justice System
Research Working Group*
Task Force on Race and the Criminal Justice System**

* The Research Working Group is grateful to the Report’s co-publishers, the Gonzaga Law
Review, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 251 (2012), the Seattle University Law Review, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
623 (2012), and the Washington Law Review, 87 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2012).
We would like to thank the members of the Research Working Group for their work in researching
and drafting this Report. The team included: Katherine Beckett, Professor, Sociology, University of
Washington; Robert Chang, Professor of Law and Director, Korematsu Center, Seattle University
School of Law; Julius Debro, Professor Emeritus, Law, Societies and Justice Program, University of
Washington; Kerry Fitz-Gerald, Reference Librarian, Seattle University School of Law; Taki
Flevaris, Advocacy Fellow, Korematsu Center, Seattle University School of Law; Jason Gillmer,
John J. Hemmingson Chair in Civil Liberties, Gonzaga University School of Law; Alexes Harris,
Associate Professor, Sociology, University of Washington; Carl McCurley, Manager, Washington
State Center for Court Research; David Perez, Assistant Director, Korematsu Center, Seattle University School of Law; Charles Reasons, Professor and Department Chair, Law and Justice, Central
Washington University; Mary Whisner, Reference Librarian, University of Washington School of
Law; and Stephanie Wilson, Head of Reference Services, Seattle University School of Law. We are
grateful for the assistance of the Office of Financial Management, the Washington State Center for
Court Research, and the Washington Association of Sheriffs and Police Chiefs for providing us with
data.
** The primary task force website can be found at Race and Criminal Justice, SEATTLE UNIV.
SCH. OF LAW, www.law.seattleu.edu/x8777.xml (last visited Jan. 25, 2012). Organizations and institutions on the Task Force include: Administrative Office of the Courts; American Civil Liberties
Union of Washington; Central Washington University; Department of Law and Justice; the Defender
Association/Racial Disparity Project; Filipino Lawyers of Washington; Fred T. Korematsu Center
for Law and Equality, Seattle University School of Law; Gonzaga University School of Law; the
Korean American Bar Association of Washington; Latina/o Bar Association of Washington; Loren
Miller Bar Association; Middle Eastern Legal Association of Washington; Mother Attorneys Mentoring Association of Seattle; QLaw: the GLBT Bar Association of Washington; Seattle City Attorney’s Office; Seattle University School of Law; University of Washington, College of Arts and
Sciences; University of Washington School of Law; Vietnamese American Bar Association of
Washington; Washington Defender Association; Washington State Access to Justice Board; Washington State Bar Association; Washington State Commission on Asian Pacific American Affairs;
Washington State Commission on Hispanic Affairs; Washington State Criminal Justice Training
Commission; Washington State Gender and Justice Commission; Washington State Minority and
Justice Commission; Washington Women Lawyers.

623

624

Seattle University Law Review
Gonzaga Law Review
Washington Law Review

[Vol. 35:623

TABLE OF CONTENTS
MESSAGE FROM THE TASK FORCE CO-CHAIRS ............................................... 626
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................... 627
DEFINITIONS ........................................................................................ 630
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 632
II. RACIAL DISPROPORTIONALITY WITHIN WASHINGTON STATE’S
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM ................................................................. 639
III. PROFFERED CAUSES FOR RACIAL DISPROPORTIONALITY .................... 641
A. Crime Commission Rates............................................................. 641
B. Structural Racism: Facially Neutral Policies with Racially
Disparate Effects ......................................................................... 644
1. Racial Disparity in Juvenile Justice ....................................... 645
2. Prosecutorial Decision-Making ............................................. 647
3. Confinement Sentencing Outcomes ...................................... 648
4. Variability and Ethnic Disparity in the Assessment of
“Legal Financial Obligations” in Washington State
Courts .................................................................................... 648
5. Racial and Ethnic Disparity in Pretrial Release
Decisions in Washington State Courts ................................... 650
6. Racial Disparity in Drug Law Enforcement .......................... 651
7. Drug-Related Asset Forfeiture Distorts Law
Enforcement Priorities in Washington State .......................... 653
8. Racial Disparity in Traffic Enforcement................................ 656
9. Racial Disparity in Driving While License Suspended
(DWLS) Cases ....................................................................... 658
10. Summary................................................................................ 661
C. Bias ................................................................................................. 661
1. Explicit Bias as Reflected in Survey Data ............................. 662
2. Implicit Bias Distorts Decisions Throughout the
Criminal Justice System ........................................................ 663
a. Overview on Implicit Bias .............................................. 663
b. Implicit Biases Are Pervasive ......................................... 664
c. Implicit Bias Research on Race and Crime .................... 665
d. Criminal Investigations and Arrests Are Influenced
by the Race of Potential/Actual Suspects, and
Often Are Based on a Faulty Application of
Majoritarian Cultural Norms .......................................... 666
e. Determinations of Guilt and Sentencing Likely Are
Influenced by the Race of Defendants, in
Conjunction with Other Extra-Legal Factors .................. 667

2012]

Task Force Report
f.

625

Cross-Racial Eyewitness Identification Is
Substantially Less Accurate, and Cross-Racial
Lineup Construction Is Less Fair .................................... 668
3. Bias and Outcomes .................................................................. 669
IV. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 670

626

Seattle University Law Review
Gonzaga Law Review
Washington Law Review

[Vol. 35:623

MESSAGE FROM THE TASK FORCE CO-CHAIRS
We are pleased to present the Preliminary Report on Race and
Washington’s Criminal Justice System, authored by the Research Working Group of the Task Force on Race and the Criminal Justice System.
The Research Working Group’s mandate was to investigate disproportionalities in the criminal justice system and, where disproportionalities
existed, to investigate possible causes. This fact-based inquiry was designed to serve as a basis for making recommendations for changes to
promote fairness, reduce disparity, ensure legitimate public safety objectives, and instill public confidence in our criminal justice system.
The Task Force came into being after a group of us met to discuss
remarks on race and crime reportedly made by two sitting justices on the
Washington State Supreme Court. This first meeting was attended by
representatives from the Washington State Bar Association, the Washington State Access to Justice Board, the commissions on Minority and Justice and Gender and Justice, all three Washington law schools, leaders
from nearly all of the state’s specialty bar associations, and other leaders
from the community and the bar.
We agreed that we shared a commitment to ensure fairness in the
criminal justice system. We developed working groups, including the
Research Working Group, whose Preliminary Report finds that race and
racial bias affect outcomes in the criminal justice system and matter in
ways that are not fair, that do not advance legitimate public safety objectives, and that undermine public confidence in our criminal justice system. All of our working groups—Oversight, Community Engagement,
Research, Recommendations/Implementation, and Education—are coordinating together to develop solutions. We are fortunate to have the formal participation of a broad range of organizations and institutions, with
each week bringing new participants. We also have many people contributing in an individual capacity, including many judges.
We have come together to offer our time, our energy, our expertise,
and our dedication to achieve fairness in our criminal justice system.
Sincerely,
Justice Steven C. González,
Past Chair, Washington State Access to Justice Board
Professor Robert S. Chang,
Director, Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality
Co-Chairs, Task Force on Race and the Criminal Justice System
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In 1980, of all states, Washington had the highest rate of disproportionate minority representation in its prisons.1 Today, minority racial and
ethnic groups remain disproportionately represented in Washington
State’s court, prison, and jail populations, relative to their share of the
state’s general population.2 The fact of racial and ethnic disproportionality in our criminal justice system is indisputable.
Our research focused on trying to answer why these disproportionalities exist. We examined differential commission rates, facially neutral
policies with disparate impacts, and bias as possible contributing causes.
We found that the assertion attributed to then Justice Sanders of the
Supreme Court of Washington that “African-Americans are overrepresented in the prison population because they commit a disproportionate
number of crimes,”3 is a gross oversimplification. Studies of particular
Washington State criminal justice practices and institutions find that race
and ethnicity influence criminal justice outcomes over and above commission rates.4 Moreover, global assertions about differential crime
commission rates are difficult to substantiate. Most crime victims do not
report crimes and most criminal offenders are never arrested.5 We never
truly know exact commission rates.6 Even if arrest rates are used as a
proxy for underlying commission rates, 2009 data show that 45% of
Washington’s imprisonment disproportionality cannot be accounted for
by disproportionality at arrest.7
We reviewed research that focused on particular areas of Washington’s criminal justice system and conclude that much of the disproportionality is explained by facially neutral policies that have racially disparate effects. For the areas, agencies, and time periods that were studied,
the following disparities were found:

1. Scott Christianson, Corrections Law Developments: Racial Discrimination and Prison Confinement—A Follow-Up, 16 CRIM. L. BULL. 616, 617 (1980).
2. See discussion infra Part II.
3. Steve Miletich, Two State Supreme Court Justices Stun Some Listeners with Race Comments, SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 21, 2010), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/20132263
10_justices22m.html.
4. See discussion infra Part III.B.
5. See infra text accompanying note 89.
6. See discussion infra Part III.A.
7. Task Force researchers analyzed 2009 data obtained from the Washington State Association
of Sheriffs and Police Chiefs, and then replicated the commission versus disparity figure, originally
compiled by Crutchfield et al., and found that 55% of the black-white disproportionality in imprisonment rates is attributable to index crime arrest rates. In other words, 45% of the racial disproportionality in imprisonment cannot be explained by and is not attributable to racial differences in arrest
rates. See discussion infra Part III.A.

628

Seattle University Law Review
Gonzaga Law Review
Washington Law Review
•

•

•

•

•
•

[Vol. 35:623

Youth of color in the juvenile justice system face harsher sentencing outcomes than similarly situated white youth, as well as
disparate treatment by probation officers.8
Defendants of color were significantly less likely than similarly
situated white defendants to receive sentences that fell below
the standard range.9
Among felony drug offenders, black defendants were 62%
more likely to be sentenced to prison than similarly situated
white defendants.10
With regard to legal financial obligations,11 similarly situated
Latino defendants receive significantly greater legal financial
obligations than their white counterparts.12
Disparate treatment exists in the context of pretrial release decisions, which systematically disfavors minority defendants.13
In Seattle, the black arrest rate for delivery of a drug other than
marijuana is twenty-one times higher than the white arrest rate
for that offense, one of the highest levels of disparity found
across the country.14 Research suggests that this disparity does
not primarily reflect different levels of involvement with illicit
drugs.15

8. George S. Bridges & Sara Steen, Racial Disparities in Official Assessments of Juvenile
Offenders: Attributional Stereotypes as Mediating Mechanisms, 63 AM. SOC. REV. 554, 567 (1998);
see also discussion infra Part III.B.1.
9. ROBERT D. CRUTCHFIELD ET AL., WASH. STATE MINORITY & JUSTICE COMM’N, WASH.
STATE SUPREME COURT, RACIAL/ETHNIC DISPARITIES AND EXCEPTIONAL SENTENCES IN
WASHINGTON STATE 72 tbl.13B (1993), available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/committee/pdf/1993
SeptRacia%20EthnicDisparitiesReport.pdf; see also discussion infra Part III.B.2. But see
CRUTCHFIELD ET AL., supra, at 72 tbl.13A (showing that whites were significantly more likely than
blacks to receive sentences above the standard range).
10. Sara Steen et al., Images of Danger and Culpability: Racial Stereotyping, Case Processing,
and Criminal Sentencing, 43 CRIMINOLOGY 435, 451 (2005); see also discussion infra Part III.B.3.
11. See WASH. REV. CODE. § 9.94A.760 (Supp. 2011) (defining a legal financial obligation and
when it may be imposed).
12. See discussion infra Part III.B.4.
13. See discussion infra Part III.B.5.
14. KATHERINE BECKETT, RACE AND DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT IN SEATTLE 56 tbl.10, 57
(2008), available at http://faculty.washington.edu/kbeckett/Race%20and%20Drug%20Law%20En
forcement%20in%20Seattle_2008.pdf.
15. See discussion infra Part III.B.6.
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Minority drivers are more likely to be searched by the Washington State Patrol than white motorists, although the rate at which
searches result in seizures is highest for whites.16

In all of these areas, facially neutral policies result in disparate
treatment of minorities over time.
Implicit and explicit racial bias also contributes to this disproportionality by influencing decision-making within the criminal justice system.17 Race and racial stereotypes play a role in the judgments and decision-making of human actors within the criminal justice system. The influence of such bias is subtle and often undetectable in any given case,
but its effects are significant, cumulative, and observable over time.18
When policymakers determine policy, when official actors exercise discretion, and when citizens proffer testimony or jury service, bias often
plays a role.19
To summarize:
• We find the assertion that the overrepresentation of black people in the Washington State prison system is due solely to differential crime commission rates inaccurate.
• We find that facially race-neutral policies that have a disparate
impact on people of color contribute significantly to disparities
in the criminal justice system.
• We find that racial and ethnic bias distorts decision-making at
various stages in the criminal justice system, contributing to
disparities.
• We find that race and racial bias matter in ways that are not fair,
that do not advance legitimate public safety objectives, that
produce disparities in the criminal justice system, and that undermine public confidence in our legal system.
16. See discussion infra Part III.B.8.
17. See, e.g., Robin S. Engel & Richard Johnson, Toward a Better Understanding of Racial
and Ethnic Disparities in Search and Seizure Rates, 34 J. CRIM. JUST. 605, 611–12 (2006); Sandra
Graham & Brian S. Lowery, Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes About Adolescent Offenders,
28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 483, 487, 499 (2004); Richard R. Johnson, Race and Police Reliance on
Suspicious Non-Verbal Cues, 30 POLICING: INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 277, 280, 286–87
(2007); Ronald Mazzella & Alan Feingold, The Effects of Physical Attractiveness, Race, Socioeconomic Status, and Gender of Defendants and Victims on Judgments of Mock Jurors: A MetaAnalysis, 24 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1315, 1333 (1994); Laura T. Sweeney & Craig Haney, The
Influence of Race on Sentencing: A Meta-Analytic Review of Experimental Studies, 10 BEHAV. SCI.
& L. 179, 192–93 (1992).
18. See Elizabeth A. Phelps et al., Performance on Indirect Measures of Race Evaluation Predicts Amygdala Activation, 12 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCI. 729, 729–30 (2000).
19. See discussion infra Part III.C.
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DEFINITIONS
What We Mean by “Disproportionality” and “Disparity”
Although the terms disproportionality and disparity often are used
interchangeably, there is an important distinction between these two concepts. We have found it useful to distinguish between racial inequities
that result from differential crime commission rates and racial inequities
that result from practices or policies. In this Report, we use disproportionality to refer to a discrepancy between reference groups’ representation in the general population and in criminal justice institutions. In contrast, we use disparity when similarly situated groups of individuals are
treated differently within those institutions, or to refer to overrepresentation of particular groups in the criminal justice system that stems from
criminal justice practices or policies.
What We Mean by “Imprisonment” and “Incarceration”
Imprisonment refers to being held in state prisons. Incarceration refers to being held in state prisons or local jails. Many local jails do not
collect and report on ethnicity, i.e., whether someone is Latino or of Hispanic origin.
What We Mean by “Rate” and “Ratio”
When discussing incarceration or imprisonment (as well as other
aspects of the criminal justice system), we often discuss the rate of incarceration or imprisonment in comparison to a particular population. Thus,
the white incarceration rate is measured by taking the number of whites
incarcerated, dividing it by the number of whites in the general population, and then multiplying by 100,000 to determine the number of whites
incarcerated per 100,000 whites in the general population. To compare
black and white incarceration, we take the black incarceration rate and
divide it by the white incarceration rate—a ratio that provides a useful
measure of comparison.
What We Mean by “Race” and “Ethnicity”
An inherent problem with race is that not many understand what
“race” means. Widely accepted understandings of race focus on biology,
invariably pointing to physical differences among humans that are used
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to define, in genetic terms, different racial groups.20 The distinctions that
we employ today to categorize humans, such as black, white, and Latino,
date back only a few centuries or less.21 These labels do not signal genetically separate branches of humankind, for there is only one human race;
no other biological race of humanity exists. Racial distinctions are largely social constructs based upon perception and history.22
Not only are these distinctions socially constructed, but they are also in constant flux and under perpetual siege by those who dispute the
arbitrary lines that they draw.23 The problem is compounded by the fact
that different institutions use the terms differently. This lack of common
nomenclature makes some comparisons difficult. When a term like
“Asian” may encompass over two billion individuals, its ability to precisely and accurately describe an individual, much less a group of individuals, becomes challenging. Similar difficulties imperil the classifications of “Hispanic” and “Latino,” which are used to describe not only
Dominicans whose descendants may be from Africa,24 but also Argentines whose ancestry may be traced to Italy,25 and Peruvians whose forefathers may have emigrated from Japan.26 Additionally, these traditional
categories have come under increasing strain because one in seven marriages within the United States is now “interracial” or “interethnic,” rendering single labels less accurate.27
In this Report, we use “race” to refer to groups of people loosely
bound together by history, ancestry, and socially significant elements of
their physical appearance. For instance, when using the term “Latina/o”—which we will use where possible rather than “Hispanic”—we
mean to describe those individuals whose ancestry is traced back to Latin
America, Spain, and Portugal. This definition contemplates race and ethnicity as social phenomena, wherein certain characteristics (i.e., history
and morphology) are given meanings by society. In this way, race and

20. Ian F. Haney López, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion,
Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 6 (1994).
21. Id. at 7–8.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Benjamin Bailey, Dominican-American Ethnic/Racial Identities and United States Social
Categories, 35 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 677, 677–78 (2001) (“The majority of Dominicans have subSaharan African ancestry, which would make them ‘black’ by historical United States ‘one-drop’
rules.” (footnote omitted)).
25. See Samuel L. Baily, Chain Migration of Italians to Argentina: Case Studies of the
Agnonesi and the Sirolesi, STUDI EMIGRAZIONE, Mar. 1982, at 73, 75–76.
26. See J. F. NORMANO & ANTONELLO GERBI, THE JAPANESE IN SOUTH AMERICA 3−4 (1943).
27. Susan Saulny, Counting by Race Can Throw off Some Numbers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10,
2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/10/us/10count.html?scp=1&sq=race%20
counting&st=cse.
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ethnicity are not objective observations rooted in biology, but rather selfreinforcing processes rooted in the daily decisions we make as individuals and as institutions. Although socially constructed and enacted, race
and ethnicity have important consequences for people’s lived experiences.
What We Mean by “Structural Racism”
A structurally racist system can be understood best as a system in
which a society’s institutions are embedded with a network of policies
and practices that, overtly or subtly, advantage one racial group over another, thereby facilitating racially disparate outcomes. Within such systems, notions and stereotypes about race and ethnicity shape actors’ identities, beliefs, attitudes, and value orientations.28 In turn, individuals interact and behave in ways that reinforce these stereotypes. Thus, even
with facially race-neutral policies, implementation decisions are informed by actors’ understandings (or lack thereof) about race and ethnicity, often leading to disparities in treatment of people of color. As a
consequence, structural racism produces cumulative and persistent racial
and ethnic inequalities.29
Racism should not be viewed as an ideology or an orientation toward a certain group but instead as a system: “[A]fter a society becomes
racialized, racialization develops a life of its own. Although it interacts
with class and gender structurations in the social system, it becomes an
organizing principle of social relations itself.”30 The persistent inequality
experienced by blacks and other people of color in America is, in part,
the result of this racial structure.31 The contemporary racial structure is
distinct from that of the past in that it is covert, is embedded within the
regular practices of institutions, does not rely on a racial vocabulary, and
is invisible to most whites.32
I. INTRODUCTION
Washington State has a mixed history when it comes to its treatment of racial and ethnic minorities. It was founded through the dis-

28. Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, Rethinking Racism: Toward a Structural Interpretation, 62 AM.
SOC. REV. 465, 475–76 (1997).
29. Id. at 475.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 467.
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placement of its native peoples by legal and extralegal means.33 Washington’s early history included severe anti-immigrant sentiment expressed
first toward Chinese immigrants34 and then Japanese immigrants, who
were the target of the state’s Alien Land Laws.35 Yet unlike other states
that instituted de jure segregation of schools and severely limited participation in the legal system,36 Washington did not mandate school segregation by law and was the only western state that did not ban interracial
marriage.37 In fact, Washington became so well known for its openness
that interracial couples would often travel there solely to get married.38 A
ready coalition of four distinct racial minorities—blacks, Chinese, Filipinos, and Japanese—worked together during the 1930s to defeat various
policies that targeted racial minorities.39 These initial campaigns laid the
groundwork for future collaboration that would cut across racial lines.40
Despite this coalition, troubling manifestations of racial discrimination in the public and private spheres continued, demonstrating that
Washington was hardly immune to racial bias. For instance, in March
1942, 14,400 persons of Japanese descent lived in Washington, including
33. See generally 31 HUBERT HOWE BANCROFT, HISTORY OF WASHINGTON, IDAHO, AND
MONTANA 1845–1889 (S.F., The History Co. 1890).
34. See, e.g., DOUG CHIN, SEATTLE’S INTERNATIONAL DISTRICT: THE MAKING OF A PANASIAN AMERICAN COMMUNITY 22 (2001) (documenting the 1886 attempted forcible removal of 350
Chinese immigrants from Seattle); ROGER DANIELS, ASIAN AMERICA: CHINESE AND JAPANESE IN
THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1850, at 59–60 (1988) (documenting the forcible removal of Chinese
from Tacoma throughout 1885 and 1886).
35. See Mark L. Lazarus III, An Historical Analysis of Alien Land Law: Washington Territory
& State 1853-1889, 12 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 197, 235–36 (1989).
36. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 8003, 8004 (Deering 1944) (repealed 1947) (authorizing the
segregation of children of Chinese, Japanese, or Mongolian parentage, and Indians under certain
circumstances); People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399 (1854) (interpreting a statute that excluded “Blacks” and
“Indians” from testifying against white defendants, and classifying Chinese persons as either “Indian” or “Black” in order to exclude the testimony of a Chinese witness against the white defendant).
37. Stefanie Johnson, Blocking Racial Intermarriage Laws in 1935 and 1937: Seattle’s First
Civil Rights Coalition, SEATTLE C.R. & LAB. HIST. PROJECT (2005), http://depts.washington.edu/
civilr/antimiscegenation.htm. The Washington Territory, however, did ban interracial marriage from
1866-1868. Act of Jan. 20, 1866, § 2(3), 1865-1866 Wash. Sess. Laws 80, 81 (“Marriages . . . are
prohibited . . . [w]hen either of the parties is a white person and the other a negro or Indian, or a
person of one-half or more negro or Indian blood.”), repealed by Act of Jan. 23, 1868, § 1, 18671868 Wash. Sess. Laws 47, 47-48; Act of Jan. 29, 1855, § 1, 1854-1855 Wash. Sess. Laws 33, 33
(“[A]ll marriages heretofore solemnized in this territory, where one of the parties to such marriage
shall be a white person, and the other possessed of one-fourth or more negro blood, or more than
one-half Indian blood, are hereby declared void.”).
38. RONALD TAKAKI, STRANGERS FROM A DIFFERENT SHORE: A HISTORY OF ASIAN
AMERICANS 342 (1989).
39. Johnson, supra note 37 (“Four distinct racial minorities—blacks, Filipinos, Japanese, and
Chinese—dominated the Seattle’s [sic] civil rights politics over the 1930s, and each group brought
something different to the political table . . . .”).
40. Id. (“The 1935 and 1937 campaigns laid the groundwork for future multi-ethnic collaboration on subsequent civil rights and progressive issues.”).
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9600 in King County alone.41 Of these, nearly 13,000 were incarcerated
and placed into internment camps.42 Over 30% of those forcibly removed
from Seattle never returned to their homes.43 After World War II, Seattle’s black population experienced its own backlash, as restrictive covenants and other forms of housing discrimination proliferated throughout
Washington between 1940 and 1960.44 These covenants were so effective
in Seattle that they functionally concentrated 78% of the black community into the area known as the “Central District.”45 While residential discrimination is no longer sanctioned by the law, its effects continue to reverberate even today.46
Even after Japanese American incarceration ended and residential
discrimination became less overt, one area continued to produce
racialized outcomes: the criminal justice system. In 1980, scholar Scott
Christianson published findings showing that Washington led the nation
in disproportionate imprisonment of blacks.47 While every state disproportionately imprisoned blacks, the overrepresentation of blacks relative
to the size of the black population was greatest in Washington.48 In a
2005 report discussing Christianson’s finding, Robert Crutchfield found
that while blacks in 1980 constituted approximately 28% of the prison
population, they constituted approximately 3% of the general population.49 The black share of the prison population was more than nine times
greater than the black share of the general population.50 Nationally, the
black share of the prison population was four times greater than the black
share of the general population.51

41. DAVID A. TAKAMI, DIVIDED DESTINY: A HISTORY OF JAPANESE AMERICANS IN SEATTLE
46 (1998).
42. Id. at 50.
43. Robert S. Chang & Catherine E. Smith, John Calmore’s America, 86 N.C. L. REV. 739,
748–49 (2008).
44. QUINTARD TAYLOR, THE FORGING OF A BLACK COMMUNITY: SEATTLE’S CENTRAL
DISTRICT FROM 1870 THROUGH THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 178–80 (1994).
45. Id. at 179.
46. Henry W. McGee, Jr., Seattle’s Central District, 1990-2006: Integration or Displacement?,
39 URB. LAW. 167, 214–16 (2007).
47. Christianson, supra note 1.
48. Id. at 616.
49. See Exhibit 2: Declaration and Report of Robert D. Crutchfield, Ph.D. at 244–45, Farrakhan v. Gregoire, No. 2:96-cv-00076-RHW (E.D. Wash. Jan. 27, 2006), ECF No. 233-4, available
at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/exhibitsstatementofmaterialfactspart3.
pdf.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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Christianson’s findings sparked a firestorm of concern among policymakers, researchers, and citizens in Washington State.52 The state legislature responded by commissioning a study to determine whether racial
disparity existed in Washington’s criminal justice system.53 The 1986
Crutchfield and Bridges study was the first in a series of studies over the
last twenty-five years to find that racial bias exists at various points in
Washington’s criminal justice system.54 In particular, this first study
found that race affects the processing of felony cases in Washington
State, even after controlling for legally relevant factors.55 That is, all
things being equal, outcomes were worse for defendants who were black
than for defendants who were white.56
In the wake of the 1986 Crutchfield and Bridges report, the state
legislature established the Washington State Minority and Justice Task
Force to study “the treatment of minorities in the state court system, to
recommend reforms and to provide an education program for the judiciary.”57 Among other findings, the 1990 report concluded that minorities
perceive “that bias pervades the entire legal system in general and hence
[minorities] do not trust the court system to resolve their disputes or administer justice evenhandedly.”58 In particular, this perception of bias
extended to criminal proceedings, where minorities reported that they
received disparate treatment from prosecutors, law enforcement authorities, and public defenders.59 The report concluded that more research was
needed to determine how race affects individual experiences with various
aspects of Washington’s criminal justice system, such as pretrial release,
bail, prosecutorial discretion, and quality of counsel.60

52. The Washington State Legislature began to focus on racial disproportionality within the
criminal justice system after Christianson’s 1980 report came out. In response, the legislature commissioned the original Crutchfield and Bridges study of 1986, which spawned many of the other
studies cited in this Report. Cumulatively, these studies make Washington one of the most, if not the
most studied state when it comes to racial disproportionality in the criminal justice system. See id. at
244.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. GEORGE S. BRIDGES & ROBERT D. CRUTCHFIELD, INST. FOR PUB. POLICY & MGMT., UNIV.
OF WASH., RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN IMPRISONMENT 26 (1986).
56. Id. at 34.
57. CHARLES Z. SMITH, WASH. STATE MINORITY & JUSTICE TASK FORCE, WASH. STATE
SUPREME COURT, FINAL REPORT, at xxi (1990), available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/committee/
pdf/TaskForce.pdf.
58. Id. at 10.
59. Id. at 25–33.
60. Id. at 21–22.
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Decades later, the perception that racial bias permeates the criminal
justice system persists.61 But now there is substantial evidence to support
the notion that racial inequities do permeate the criminal justice system.
Subsequent studies commissioned since 1986 have confirmed that Washington cannot justify its disproportionate minority incarceration rates on
the sole basis that minorities commit more crimes.62 For instance, the
extant research concerning the Washington State Patrol suggests that race
does not affect police discretion with regard to stops but does affect
searches.63 Other research indicates that Seattle drug arrest patterns and
outcomes are shaped by race.64 Another study found that even after controlling for legally relevant factors, racial differences affect how cases
are processed: minorities were more likely than whites to be held in custody prior to trial, less likely than whites to be released on personal recognizance following arrest, and more likely to receive monetary bail.65
While these and other studies have focused on different decision-making
points in the criminal justice system, one troubling conclusion, in par-

61. See, e.g., SAM PAILCA, OFFICE OF PROF’L ACCOUNTABILITY, SEATTLE POLICE DEP’T,
REPORT ON SEATTLE’S RESPONSE TO CONCERNS ABOUT RACIALLY BIASED POLICING 1 (2003),
available at http://www.seattle.gov/police/opa/Docs/BiasedPolicing.pdf (discussing the widespread
perception that racial bias exists in law enforcement).
62. See Exhibit 2: Declaration and Report of Robert D. Crutchfield, Ph.D., supra note 49, at
237–40.
63. See, e.g., NICHOLAS P. LOVRICH ET AL., DIV. OF GOV’TL STUDIES & SERVS., WASH. STATE
UNIV., REPORT TO THE WASHINGTON STATE PATROL 23, 42–43 (2007) [hereinafter LOVRICH ET AL.,
2007 WSP REPORT], available at http://www.wsp.wa.gov/publications/reports/wsu_2007_report.pdf
(finding that police stops involving blacks, Native-Americans, and Hispanics are more likely to
result in searches); NICHOLAS P. LOVRICH ET AL., DIV. OF GOV’TL STUDIES & SERVS., WASH. STATE
UNIV., ANALYSIS OF TRAFFIC STOP DATA COLLECTED BY THE WASHINGTON STATE PATROL 2
(2005), available at http://www.policeforum.org/library/racially-biased-policing/supplementalresour
ces/wsu_2005_report[1].pdf (finding the same); NICHOLAS LOVRICH ET AL., DIV. OF GOV’TL
STUDIES & SERVS., WASH. STATE UNIV., WSP TRAFFIC STOP DATA ANALYSIS PROJECT REPORT 2–
3 (2003) [hereinafter LOVRICH ET AL., 2003 WSP REPORT], available at http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/
viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.102.7223&rep=rep1&type=pdf (finding the same).
64. Katherine Beckett et al., Race, Drugs, and Policing: Understanding Disparities in Drug
Delivery Arrests, 44 CRIMINOLOGY 105, 119, 129 (2006) [hereinafter Beckett et al., Race, Drugs,
and Policing] (concluding that racially disproportionate drug arrest rates in Seattle cannot be explained by comparing commission rates, but rather are the result of police practices that have a racially disparate impact); Katherine Beckett et al., Drug Use, Drug Possession Arrests, and the Question of Race: Lessons from Seattle, 52 SOC. PROBS. 419, 435–36 (2005) [hereinafter Beckett et al.,
Lessons from Seattle] (concluding the same).
65. GEORGE S. BRIDGES, WASH. STATE MINORITY & JUSTICE COMM’N, WASH. STATE
SUPREME COURT, A STUDY ON RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN SUPERIOR COURT BAIL AND
PRE-TRIAL DETENTION PRACTICES IN WASHINGTON 52–53 (1997), available at http://www.courts.
wa.gov/committee/pdf/1997_ResearchStudy.pdf.
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ticular, underlies each study’s findings: when it comes to Washington
State’s criminal justice system, race matters.
Given this state’s history and the evidence demonstrating the importance of race in the criminal justice system, members of the community were understandably concerned when two sitting Washington State
Supreme Court Justices opined on October 7, 2010 that racial minorities
are overrepresented in the prison population solely because they commit
more crimes and not because any bias exists in the criminal justice system.66 The comments themselves betrayed a common misunderstanding
about whether this issue is more complex than a cursory review of certain crime conviction rates might imply. Conviction rates are not a valid
proxy for commission rates.
In the wake of these comments, concerned community members
came together to form the Task Force on Race and the Criminal Justice
System. We met because the simplistic notion that black overrepresentation in our prisons occurs because blacks commit more crimes did not fit
with our sense of how racial and ethnic minorities are treated in today’s
society and in our criminal justice system. We realized quickly, though,
that it was important not to proceed on assumptions that unfair treatment
existed.
The Task Force divided into five working groups: Oversight,
Community Engagement, Research, Recommendations/Implementation,
and Education. The Research Working Group’s mandate was to investigate disproportionalities in the criminal justice system and, where disproportionalities existed, investigate possible causes. This fact-based inquiry was designed to serve as a basis for recommending changes that
would promote fairness, reduce disparity, ensure legitimate public safety
objectives, and instill public confidence in our criminal justice system.
As we engaged in this work, the Research Working Group reported back
to the broader Task Force. Our membership grew as more and more organizations and institutions recognized the importance of this issue, not
just for the affected racial and ethnic groups, but also for the best aspirations we have as a state. One measure of the goodwill of the people of
the State of Washington is the broad range of organizations and individuals who have joined the Task Force, for what all of us have come to realize is a multi-year project.
For this Report, the Research Working Group reviewed evidence on
disproportionality in Washington’s criminal justice system and considered whether crime commission rates accounted for this disproportionality. We found that crime commission rates by race and ethnicity are large66. Miletich, supra note 3.
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ly unknown and perhaps unknowable, but that some researchers simply
take arrest rates as good proxies for underlying commission rates for all
crimes.67 We found that use of arrest rates likely overstates black crime
commission rates for several reasons.68 But even if arrest rates are used
as a proxy for underlying crime commission rates, the extent of racial
disproportionality is not explained by commission rates. In 1982, 80% of
black imprisonment in Washington for serious crimes could not be accounted for based on arrest rates, though by 2009, this had dropped to
45%.69
We then identified and synthesized research on nine issues for
which evidence exists regarding the causes of Washington’s disproportionality: (1) juvenile justice; (2) prosecutorial decision-making; (3) sentencing outcomes; (4) legal financial obligations (“LFOs”); (5) pretrial
release; (6) drug enforcement; (7) asset forfeiture; (8) traffic enforcement; and (9) prosecution for Driving While License Suspended
(“DWLS”). In each of these areas, the research, data, and findings pertain specifically to Washington State.70
We also reviewed research regarding bias, especially research on
unconscious or implicit bias. We found that cognitive neuroscience and
social psychology help us to better understand the existence and behavioral consequences of unconscious or implicit racism.71
The evidence we gathered demonstrates that within Washington
State’s criminal justice system, race and ethnicity matter in ways that are
inconsistent with fairness, that do not advance legitimate public safety
objectives, and that undermine public confidence.
Part II presents the Working Group’s findings and data regarding
racial disproportionality within Washington State’s criminal justice system. Part III discusses three possible causes for this disproportionality.
Part III.A discusses differential commission rates, concluding that this
factor alone cannot account for the disproportionality observed in the

67. See, e.g., Alfred Blumstein, On the Racial Disproportionality of United States’ Prison
Populations, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1259, 1264 (1982).
68. For instance, because most black victims identify their assailants as black, and because
black victims have a higher reporting rate generally, crimes involving black suspects are more likely
to receive police attention. See discussion infra Part III.A.
69. Robert D. Crutchfield et al., Analytical and Aggregation Biases in Analyses of Imprisonment: Reconciling Discrepancies in Studies of Racial Disparity, 31 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 166,
179 (1994); see also discussion infra Part III.A.
70. The informational resources and preliminary findings were made available to the Recommendations and Implementation Working Group to help inform their policy recommendations.
71. See, e.g., Phelps et al., supra note 18.
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criminal justice system. Part III.B discusses seven racially neutral policies that have racially disparate effects, and thus help explain racial disproportionality. Finally, Part III.C discusses bias, whether explicit or implicit, and how it produces racial disparity.
II. RACIAL DISPROPORTIONALITY WITHIN WASHINGTON STATE’S
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
For context, we note that the United States has the highest
incarceration rate of any country in the world, more than twice as great
as the two Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
countries with the next highest rates (Chile and Israel), more than six
times that of Canada, nearly four times that of Mexico, and nearly five
times as great as the United Kingdom.72 Within the United States, the
high incarceration rate is disproportionately experienced by certain racial
and ethnic groups, with whites incarcerated at a rate of 412 per 100,000
white residents, blacks incarcerated at a rate of 2290 per 100,000 black
residents, and Latinos incarcerated at a rate of 742 per 100,000 Latino
residents.73 In the United States, drawing from 2005 data, blacks are
incarcerated at 5.6 times and Latinos at 1.8 times the rate of whites.74
Table 1—Prison and Jail Incarceration Rates and Ratios, 2005, United States

White
Black
Latino

Incarceration rate
(per 100,000)
412
2290
742

Disproportionality ratio
(in comparison to White)
n/a
5.6
1.8

Source: MARC MAUER & RYAN S. KING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, UNEVEN JUSTICE:
STATE RATES OF INCARCERATION BY RACE AND ETHNICITY 4 tbl.1 (2007), available at
http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/rd_stateratesofincbyraceandethnicity.pdf.

In 2005, the black incarceration rate in Washington, 2522 per
100,000 black residents, was greater than the national average.75 The
Latino incarceration rate, reported at 527 per 100,000 Latino residents,
was lower than the national average. We include this figure with caution,
72. World Prison Brief, Entire World—Prison Population Rates per 100,000 of the National
Population, INT’L CTR. FOR PRISON STUDIES, http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/worldbrief/wpb_
stats.php?area=all&category=wb_poprate (last visited Dec. 30, 2011). An OECD country is one that
participates in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development whose purpose is to
coordinate policy among certain developed countries.
73. MARC MAUER & RYAN S. KING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, UNEVEN JUSTICE: STATE
RATES OF INCARCERATION BY RACE AND ETHNICITY 4 tbl.1 (2007), available at http://
sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/rd_stateratesofincbyraceandethnicity.pdf.
74. Id. at 3.
75. Id. at 6 tbl.2, 11 tbl.6, 13 tbl.7.
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however, because many local jails, including King County’s, do not
collect ethnic demographic information. In 2005, blacks in Washington
were incarcerated at 6.4 times and Latinos at 1.3 times the rate of whites,
with the caveat that the Latino figure likely reflects both an undercount
of Latinos and an overcount of whites.76 The fact of racial and ethnic disproportionality in Washington’s incarcerated population is indisputable.
Table 2—Prison and Jail Incarceration Rates and Ratios, 2005, Washington

White
Black
Latino

Incarceration rate
(per 100,000)
393
2522
527

Disproportionality ratio
(in comparison to White)
n/a
6.4
1.3

Source: MAUER & KING, supra, at 6 tbl.2.

Our review of more recent data reveals that racial and ethnic disproportionalities exist at many different stages of the criminal justice system, including arrest, charging, conviction, and imprisonment.77 The figure below shows 2010 black-white and Native-white disproportionality
ratios at conviction for serious felonies by offense categories. The figure
shows that the disproportionalities are not consistent for different offense
categories.

76. Id. at 6 tbl.2. The result is that the Latino-white ratio is likely significantly greater than 1.3
to 1 and the black-white ratio is probably slightly higher than 6.4 to 1. Id.
77. See discussion infra Part III.
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Figure 1—2010 Hispanic-White, Native-American-White, and BlackWhite Disproportionality Ratios at Conviction for Serious Felonies by Offense
Categories78
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The data provided to us by the Office of Financial Management, the
Washington State Center for Court Research, and the Washington Association of Sheriffs and Police Chiefs on arrests, charges, convictions, and
imprisonment show that racial and ethnic disproportionalities still exist at
these different points in Washington’s criminal justice system. We turn
now to examine possible causes of these disproportionalities.
III. PROFFERED CAUSES FOR RACIAL DISPROPORTIONALITY
A. Crime Commission Rates
The best available evidence suggests that the disproportionalities
discussed in Part II are only partly attributable to racial differences in
crime commission rates. It is important to note that crime commission
rates cannot be known directly and can only be estimated. Generally, two
methods are used to estimate the level of crime commission among different racial and ethnic groups. Some criminologists use crime victimization survey data in which victims identify the perceived race of their assailant to gain insight regarding differential commission rates by race.79
These data reflect victim perceptions of racial identity of their assailant
78. These ratios are comparisons between the rates per 100,000. For example, Figure 1 illustrates that blacks and Native-Americans are, respectively, over five and two times more likely than
whites to be convicted of a violent offense. The 2010 data are on file with the Gonzaga Law Review.
79. See, e.g., Patrick A. Langan, Racism on Trial: New Evidence to Explain the Racial Composition of Prisons in the United States, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 666 (1985) (relying on victim
reports to generate a study on the racial composition of prisons).
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and include only nonfatal but violent crimes where there is direct contact
between the victim and the perpetrator (e.g., robbery, rape, and assault).80
Because information about victim perceptions of perpetrators’ race is
available for only a few violent offenses, crime victimization survey data
present an incomplete picture of crime commission rates by race.
Other criminologists use arrests as a proxy for crime commission.81
But this likely presents a distorted picture because blacks are overrepresented in arrests compared to victim identifications. For example, in the
2005 crime victim survey, victims of nonfatal violent crimes identified
their assailants as black 23.7% of the time.82 By contrast, 39% of those
arrested for nonfatal violent crimes in 2005 were black.83 Consequently,
studies that treat arrests as a measure of crime commission will likely
overstate the rate of crime commission by blacks and therefore underestimate racial disparity in criminal justice processing.
A recent comprehensive review of data from numerous studies of
the effect of race on the police decision to arrest similarly concludes that
minority suspects are more likely to be arrested than white suspects.84
This analysis controls for “demeanor, offense severity, presence of witnesses, quantity of evidence at the scene, the occurrence or discovery of
a new criminal offense during the encounter, the suspect being under the
influence of drugs or alcohol, prior record of suspect, [and] requests to
arrest by victims . . . .”85 Race appears to have an impact apart from these
factors.86
Differences in reporting practices and offending patterns may also
contribute to the overrepresentation of black suspects among arrestees.
As a result of these differences, black suspects are more likely to come to
the attention of the police.87 Specifically, most white victims identify
80. See id.
81. See, e.g., Blumstein, supra note 67.
82. Victimization survey data are drawn from BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, SER. NO. NCJ 215244, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 2005
STATISTICAL TABLES tbls.40 & 46 (2006), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv
us05.pdf.
83. Arrest data are drawn from Crime in the United States 2005, FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION tbl.43 (Sept. 2006), http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/05cius/data/table_43.html.
84. Tammy Rinehart Kochel et al., Effect of Suspect Race on Officers’ Arrest Decisions, 49
CRIMINOLOGY 473, 475 (2011).
85. Id. at 495–98.
86. Id. at 490.
87. ERIKA HARRELL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SER. NO. NCJ
214258, BLACK VICTIMS OF VIOLENT CRIME 5 tbl.5 (2007), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/
content/pub/pdf/bvvc.pdf (noting the percentage of violent victimization from 2001 to 2005, by
victim race/Hispanic origin and offender race).
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their assailants as white, and most black victims identify their assailants
as black.88 Over half of violent crimes and over 60% of property crimes
are not reported by victims to the police.89 Higher reporting rates among
black victims mean that crimes involving black suspects are more likely
to come to the attention of the police.90
But even if we use arrest rates as a proxy for crime commission,
there remains a very significant disproportionality at imprisonment that
is not accounted for by arrest rates. A 1994 study by Crutchfield, Bridges, and Pitchford compared black-white disproportionality in 1982 index
crime arrests and incarceration rates, and found that differential rates of
crime commission (as measured by arrest) explained only 19.3% of the
black-white disproportionality in Washington State prisons.91 Using 2009
data obtained from the Washington State Association of Sheriffs and Police Chiefs, we replicated the Crutchfield et al. analysis and found that
55% of the black-white disproportionality in imprisonment rates is attributable to index crime arrest rates.92 In other words, 45% of the racial
disproportionality in imprisonment is not attributable to racial differences
in arrest rates. Thus, it appears that a larger share of disproportionality in
confinement rates stems from arrest patterns than was the case in 1982.
However, the 55% figure should not be interpreted as evidence that
differences in crime commission rates explain over half of the overrepresentation of blacks in state prisons for several reasons.93 First, this interpretation assumes arrests are an accurate measure of crime, but it is likely that they overrepresent people of color for the reasons stated above. In
particular, arrest data probably overrepresent black suspects.94 In addition, Latinos are not identified as such in the arrest and incarceration data
88. Id.
89. JENNIFER L. TRUMAN & MICHAEL R. RAND, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, SER. NO. NCJ 231327, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2009, at 9 tbl.12 (2010), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv09.pdf (noting the percentage of crimes reported to the
police in 2009, by gender, race, and Hispanic origin).
90. Id.
91. Crutchfield et al., supra note 69.
92. Index crimes are defined by the FBI and include homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny (over $50), motor vehicle theft, and arson. Uniform Crime Reporting Program Frequently Asked Questions, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 2 (Apr. 2009), http://www.fbi.
gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/frequently-asked-questions/ucr_faqs08.pdf. The 2009 data are on file with the
Gonzaga Law Review. This analysis involved calculating the black-white arrest and imprisonment
disproportionality ratios, and then the percent of the latter that is a function of the former.
93. Nor should this figure be interpreted to mean that 45% of disproportionality in confinement
necessarily stems from race differences in criminal justice processing: legally relevant factors such
as offender score may account for some or all of this discrepancy.
94. Arrest data are problematic because a comparison of victimization surveys and arrest data
show that blacks are arrested at a higher rate than they are identified by victims. See discussion
supra notes 87–92; see also Kochel et al., supra note 84.
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for which the 55% figure is derived.95 Because most Latinos in Washington State are identified racially as white in these data, the white arrest
and incarceration rates used in these calculations are inflated, and the
results therefore underestimate the extent to which blacks are overrepresented at the arrest stage relative to crime commission rates. Finally, this
method assesses disproportionality in state prisons but does not tell us
anything about racial disproportionalities in jails, community supervision, and misdemeanor courts. Indeed it is likely that discretion and disproportionality are greater in these parts of the criminal justice system.
Thus, concluding that 55% of the racial disproportionality in imprisonment rates is attributable to arrest patterns, and assuming that arrest patterns reflect crime commission rates, overstates the extent to which disproportionality in prisons flows from differential crime commission
rates. Whatever the precise figure, it is clear that differential crime commission rates can explain only a part of the racial disproportionalities that
characterize Washington State courts, jails, and prisons.
B. Structural Racism: Facially Neutral Policies
with Racially Disparate Effects
The Research Working Group focused its efforts on nine issues
covered by existing research and data, and in each area we found that
racial disproportionalities are caused, in part, by practices and policies
that produce racially disparate outcomes. We are not arguing that particular individuals, actors, or agencies are intentionally discriminating. The
studies described below do not prove that any one actor or group of actors is racist. Rather, the research as a whole suggests that Washington
State’s criminal justice system facilitates racially disparate outcomes in
two more subtle ways. First, in some instances, facially neutral policies
have racially disparate outcomes. For example, judicial consideration of
ostensibly race-neutral factors such as employment status when making
pretrial release decisions disadvantages defendants of color because they
are less likely than white defendants to be employed.96
95. Again, this is because some state and local agencies do not identify Latinos as a separate
racial group.
96. See Washington State Employment Situation Report for March 2010, WASH. STATE EMP’T
SEC. DEP’T (Apr. 13, 2010), http://www.workforceexplorer.com/article.asp?ARTICLEID=10307,
which states:
Historically, the Black or African American population has had the highest unemployment rates, roughly twice that of both white and Asian populations. For the first quarter
of 2010, the Black or African American population had an unemployment rate of 16.7
percent, the white and Asian populations, 9.5 percent and 8.1 percent, respectively. The
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Second, the research suggests that the race or ethnicity of suspects
and defendants affects how those individuals are perceived, and that this
perception impacts how they are treated within the criminal justice system. The literature on implicit bias, discussed in Part III.C, shows that
these race effects are likely to be unconscious and unintended rather than
conscious and purposeful. While traditional models of racism emphasize
individual acts of discrimination or racially charged policies, structural
racism describes the interaction between various institutions and practices that are neutral on their face but nevertheless produce racialized outcomes.97
Put differently, structures matter and a system’s structure has a tremendous influence over the results a system produces. Policies can produce foreseeable, if unintended, harms that run along racial lines.98
Moreover, bias may be unconscious or conscious. This suggests that we
should not concentrate on individual motives but instead should focus on
those practices and procedures whose cumulative effect is to facilitate
racialized outcomes—that is, outcomes that fall along racial lines. By
identifying and then reforming these structures and processes, we can
begin to address racial disproportionality within Washington’s criminal
justice system.
The Research Working Group’s findings are discussed below regarding each studied context of disproportionality in Washington State’s
criminal justice system.
1. Racial Disparity in Juvenile Justice
Youth of color are overrepresented in Washington State’s juvenile
justice system.99 Although policymakers, practitioners, and researchers
have studied this disproportionate minority contact (DMC) for the past
twenty years,100 the problem still persists. For example, in 2007, AfricanAmerican youth comprised just under 6% of the state’s population aged
ten through seventeen years, but comprised roughly 12% of the state’s
Black or African American unemployment rate jumped by 3.1 percent between the first
quarter of 2009 and the first quarter of 2010, while white and Asian populations increased only 1.3 percent and 1.6 percent, respectively.
97. See generally John A. Powell, Structural Racism: Building upon the Insights of John
Calmore, 86 N.C. L. REV. 791 (2008).
98. Id. at 794.
99. WASH. STATE SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, DISPROPORTIONALITY AND DISPARITY
IN JUVENILE SENTENCING, FISCAL YEAR 2005, at 1 & tbl.1 (2005), available at http://www.
cfc.wa.gov/PublicationSentencing/DisparityDisproportionality/Adult_DisparityDisproportionality_F
Y2005.pdf.
100. See, e.g., Emily R. Cabaniss et al., Reducing Disproportionate Minority Contact in the
Juvenile Justice System: Promising Practices, 12 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 393, 394–400
(2007) (discussing scholarly and congressional efforts that have taken place since 1988).
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juvenile arrests.101 Youth of color are similarly overrepresented at the
disposition stage (that is, the stage at which a decision or conviction is
rendered). Two years prior, in 2005, African-American youth comprised
just under 4% of the state’s population, but received over 13% of the
state’s juvenile dispositions.102 There was a similar pattern of overrepresentation for Latino youth (11% of the state population, yet received 14%
of the juvenile dispositions)103 and for Native-American youth (2% of the
state population yet received nearly 5% of the juvenile dispositions).104
This disproportionality is even greater for youth committed to the
Juvenile Rehabilitation Administration (“JRA”).105 The proportion of
African-American youth in JRA facilities is five to six times the proportion of their population in the state;106 Native-American youth reside in
JRA facilities at a rate of two times the proportion of their respective
population in Washington State.107
Even worse, it appears that youth of color may receive disparate
sentencing decisions. In 2005, African-American and Asian or Pacific
Islander youth were sentenced to the longest average terms in county
detention.108 African-American youth also received the longest terms of
dispositions involving electronic home monitoring and work crew.109
Factors other than differential crime commission rates may contribute to these racialized outcomes. For instance, a study of probation officers’ assessments of youth in Washington State has found that AfricanAmerican youth receive more negative attribution assessments about the
causes of their offenses than white youth and that these characterizations
lead to more punitive sentence recommendations.110 In particular, the
study shows that probation officers consistently portray black youth differently than white youth in descriptions about the nature of their crimi101. GOVERNOR’S JUVENILE JUSTICE ADVISORY COMM., WASH. STATE DEP’T OF SOC. &
HEALTH SERVS., TITLE II FORMULA GRANTS PROGRAM APPLICATION: COMPREHENSIVE 3-YEAR
PLAN FOR FFY 2009-2011, at 13 (2009), available at http://juvjustice.njjn.org/media/resources/pub
lic/resource_308.pdf.
102. See WASH. STATE SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, supra note 99.
103. See id.
104. Id.
105. Washington State’s JRA serves the state’s highest-risk youth. See GOVERNOR’S JUVENILE
JUSTICE ADVISORY COMM., supra note 101, at 4. A county juvenile court may commit a particular
juvenile offender to JRA custody if the individual has committed many lower-level offenses or a
serious crime. See id.
106. WASH. STATE SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, supra note 99, at 3 & tbl.2.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Bridges & Steen, supra note 8.

2012]

Task Force Report

647

nal offending.111 Black youths’ crimes are commonly attributed to internal traits (attitudes and personalities) while white youths’ crimes are attributed to their social environment (peers and family).112 These characterizations shape probation officers’ assessments about the threat of future offending and lead to more severe sanctions and sentencing recommendations for black youth.113
Policy changes are needed to both assess and address rates of DMC
and to investigate the mechanisms that produce the disproportionate and
disparate outcomes. We recommend increasing the quality and access to
data management systems that can generate case characteristics. These
characteristics are critical to investigating the extent of DMC and the
processes that lead to the overrepresentation.
Furthermore, decision-making environments need to be explored
for points of discretion that can lead to youth of color being overselected
for more severe sanctioning decisions (such as policies leading to detention decisions and practices of case assessments and recommendations).
Organizational climates should recognize the ways in which subtle biases
can enter into decision-making, and decision-makers should openly discuss how differences in culture can influence processing decisions.
2. Prosecutorial Decision-Making
Prosecutors’ charging decisions and sentencing recommendations
have an important impact on criminal justice outcomes. For example, a
1995 study by Crutchfield, Weis, Engen, and Gainey found that prosecutors are significantly less likely to file charges against white defendants
than they are against defendants of color.114 This difference persists even
after legally relevant factors—offense seriousness, criminal history, and
weapons charges—are taken into account.115 That study also found that
King County prosecutors recommend longer confinement sentences for
black defendants (after legal factors were held constant), and that prosecutors are 75% less likely to recommend alternative sentences for black
defendants than for similarly situated white defendants.116

111. Id. at 563–64.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 564–66.
114. ROBERT D. CRUTCHFIELD ET AL., WASH. STATE MINORITY & JUSTICE COMM’N, WASH.
STATE SUPREME COURT, RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN THE PROSECUTION OF FELONY CASES
IN KING COUNTY 4 (1995), available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/committee/pdf/November%201
995%20Report.pdf.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 39–40.
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3. Confinement Sentencing Outcomes
Several studies following the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981117
find that race shapes confinement sentence outcomes in Washington
State—that is, those sentences that lead to jail time. A 2003 study by
Engen, Gainey, Crutchfield, and Weis found that defendants of color are
moderately less likely than similarly situated white defendants to receive
sentences that fall below the standard range.118 A 2004 study by Fernandez and Bowman found that Latino defendants sentenced in conservative
counties with comparatively large Latino populations are less likely to
receive the statutorily established drug-offender sentencing alternative
than other defendants.119 And most recently, a 2005 study by Steen,
Engen, and Gainey found that among felony drug offenders, the odds that
a black defendant will be sentenced to prison are 62% greater than the
odds for similarly situated white defendants.120 These studies clearly indicate that race and ethnicity matter for confinement sentencing outcomes.
4. Variability and Ethnic Disparity in the Assessment of
“Legal Financial Obligations” in Washington State Courts
Whenever a person is convicted in a Washington State superior
court, the court may order the payment of a “legal financial obligation”
(LFO), which is essentially a financial penalty that the defendant must
pay as a consequence of the conviction.121 LFOs are now a common supplement to prison, jail, and probation sentences for people convicted of
crimes in Washington State courts. For example, all felons must be assessed a $500 Victim Penalty Assessment Fee for each conviction and a
$100 DNA Collection Fee at the time of the first conviction.122 Although
fine and fee amounts are specified statutorily, judges have significant

117. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.94A.010−.930 (2010 & Supp. 2011).
118. Rodney L. Engen et al., Discretion and Disparity Under Sentencing Guidelines: The Role
of Departures and Structured Sentencing Alternatives, 41 CRIMINOLOGY 99, 116–17 (2003); see
also CRUTCHFIELD ET AL., supra note 9, at 32, 34, 72 tbl.13B.
119. Kenneth E. Fernandez & Timothy Bowman, Race, Political Institutions, and Criminal
Justice: An Examination of the Sentencing of Latino Offenders, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 41,
63, 66–68 (2004).
120. Steen et al., supra note 10.
121. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.760 (Supp. 2011).
122. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 7.68.035, 43.43.690 (2010 & Supp. 2011).
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discretion in determining whether to impose many other authorized fees
and fines.123
This judicial discretion has led to a high degree of variability in
LFO assessment. Significant variation exists even among similar cases
and similarly situated offenders.124 For example, one first-time white defendant convicted of delivery of methamphetamine in the first two
months of 2004 was assessed $610 in fees and fines; in a different county, another first-time white defendant convicted of the same crime during
the same time period was assessed $6710 in fees and fines.125
This variability also fosters racialized outcomes. A recent study of
Washington State LFOs found that a number of extra-legal factors influence the assessment of fees and fines, even after controlling for offender
and Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) offense score.126 In particular, the statistical analysis shows that Latino defendants receive significantly greater fees and fines than similarly situated non-Latino defendants.127
The debt that accrues from the assessment of fees and fines is substantial relative to ex-offenders’ expected earnings.128 For instance, defendants sentenced in the first two months of 2004 had been assessed an
average of $11,471 by the courts over their lifetime.129 Because Washington State currently charges 12% interest on unpaid LFOs, these financial
obligations often persist and expand over the course of many years.130 By
2008, the individuals sentenced in early 2004 still owed an average of
$10,840 in court debt.131 Ex-offenders who consistently pay $50 a month
will still possess legal debt after thirty years of regular monthly payments.132 Legal debt—and poor credit ratings—constrains opportunities
and limits access to housing, education, and economic markets.133 Non-

123. KATHERINE A. BECKETT ET AL., WASH. STATE MINORITY & JUSTICE COMM’N, WASH.
STATE SUPREME COURT, THE ASSESSMENT AND CONSEQUENCES OF LEGAL FINANCIAL
OBLIGATIONS IN WASHINGTON STATE 9–10 (2008), available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/commit
tee/pdf/2008LFO_report.pdf.
124. Id. at 24 tbl.4 (depicting wide variations in Washington State superior court LFO assessments).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 23–25.
127. Id. at 24–25; see also Alexes Harris et al., Courtesy Stigma and Monetary Sanctions:
Toward a Socio-Cultural Theory of Punishment, 76 AM. SOC. REV. 234, 248–52 (2011).
128. Alexes Harris et al., Drawing Blood from Stones: Legal Debt and Social Inequality in the
Contemporary United States, 115 AM. J. SOC. 1753, 1756 (2010).
129. Id. at 1773–75.
130. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.82.090 (Supp. 2011).
131. Harris et al., supra note 128, at 1775.
132. Id. at 1776–77.
133. Id. at 1777–82.
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payment of legal debt may also trigger arrest and reincarceration.134 We
believe that the fairness and wisdom of the laws authorizing the discretionary assessment of legal financial obligations need to be reevaluated.
5. Racial and Ethnic Disparity in Pretrial Release
Decisions in Washington State Courts
Whether an individual is released pending trial has a significant influence on the outcome of a case, and it can have cascading effects on a
defendant’s family, ability to maintain a job, and ability to pay for representation.135 The Bureau of Justice Statistics found that 78% of defendants held on bail while awaiting trial were convicted, compared to 60%
of defendants who were released pending trial.136 In addition, defendants
held on bail receive more severe sentences than defendants not detained
prior to trial.137 Studies suggest that this correlation is not solely a function of case characteristics.138 Rather, detention itself has a small but statistically significant effect on nonfelony case outcomes and a significant
impact on felony case outcomes.139
Although Washington State court rules specify factors courts must
consider when determining whether to release a defendant, judges retain
significant discretion.140 Research demonstrates that extra-legal factors,
including race and ethnicity, significantly impact pretrial release decisions.141 In particular, the evidence shows that blacks and Latinos are
detained before trial at higher rates than white defendants.142 For instance, a 1997 University of Washington study found that “minority defendants and men were less likely to be released on their own recogni134. Id. at 1782–85; see also AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, IN FOR A PENNY: THE RISE OF
AMERICA’S NEW DEBTORS’ PRISONS 5, 6 (2010), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/
_web.pdf#page=8.
135. See generally JOHN S. GOLDKAMP, TWO CLASSES OF ACCUSED: A STUDY OF BAIL AND
DETENTION IN AMERICAN JUSTICE (1979).
136. THOMAS H. COHEN & BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, SER. NO. NCJ 214994, PRETRIAL RELEASE OF FELONY DEFENDANTS IN STATE COURTS 7 &
tbl.5 (2007), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/prfdsc.pdf.
137. Id.
138. MARY T. PHILLIPS, N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, INC., PRETRIAL DETENTION AND
CASE OUTCOMES, PART 1: NONFELONY CASES 6 (2007), available at http://www.cjareports.org/
reports/detention.pdf; MARY T. PHILLIPS, N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, INC., PRETRIAL
DETENTION AND CASE OUTCOMES, PART 2: FELONY CASES 58 (2008) [hereinafter PHILLIPS, FELONY
CASE OUTCOMES], available at http://www.cjareports.org/reports/felonydetention.pdf.
139. PHILLIPS, FELONY CASE OUTCOMES, supra note 138.
140. BRIDGES, supra note 65, at 1–2.
141. Id. at 7.
142. Id. at 52–53.
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zance than others even after adjusting for differences among defendants
in the severity of their crimes, prior criminal records, ties to the community and the prosecuting attorney’s recommendation.”143 Thus, defendants of color are held on bail at higher rates than other defendants. Given
how much pretrial detention affects case outcomes, this finding is troubling.
Judges’ consideration of seemingly race-neutral factors may explain
the disparate pretrial detention of defendants of color. In particular, when
determining whether to release a defendant or to impose bail, judges often consider the defendant’s employment status, the length and character
of the defendant’s residence in the community, and the defendant’s family ties and relationships.144 Though presumably not designed to disadvantage people of color, consideration of these factors often has that consequence.145 African-Americans, Native-Americans, and Latinos are
more likely to be economically disadvantaged, have unstable employment, experience more family disruptions, and have more residential
mobility.146 Judicial focus on such factors means that people from these
ethnic groups are less likely to be released on their own recognizance
than whites.147 We suggest that courts should consider factors that are not
only race-neutral on their face but also race-neutral in practice when
making pretrial detention decisions.
6. Racial Disparity in Drug Law Enforcement
Seattle has one of the highest rates of racial disparity in drug arrests
in the United States.148 Although only 8% of Seattle’s population is
black, 67% of those who are arrested for delivery of a serious drug (narcotics other than marijuana) in Seattle are black.149 However, a rigorous,
data-driven 2008 analysis of drug use, delivery, and law enforcement
patterns in Seattle indicates that this racial disparity in arrest rates does
not reflect the reality of the local drug economy.150 Nor is it a function of
public health, public safety, or civilian complaints.151

143. Id. at 7.
144. Id. at 12.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 53.
148. BECKETT, supra note 14, at 56 tbl.10; Beckett et al., Race, Drugs, and Policing, supra
note 64, at 115 & tbl.1.
149. BECKETT, supra note 14, at 56 tbl.10.
150. Id. at 1; see also Beckett et al., Race, Drugs, and Policing, supra note 64, at 119; Beckett
et al., Lessons from Seattle, supra note 64, at 419, 426–29.
151. BECKETT, supra note 14, at 3; see also Beckett et al., Race, Drugs, and Policing, supra
note 64, at 129; Beckett et al., Lessons from Seattle, supra note 64, at 430–35.
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According to Seattle Police Department (“SPD”) arrest figures, the
total black drug arrest rate was more than thirteen times higher than the
white drug arrest rate in 2006.152 Blacks were more than twenty-one
times more likely to be arrested for selling serious drugs than whites in
2005 to 2006, despite the fact that multiple sources suggest that whites
are the majority of sellers and users of serious drugs in Seattle.153 This
rate of disparity is surpassed by only one of the other thirty-eight comparably sized cities in the nation for which data are available.154
The research shows that the primary cause of racial disparity in Seattle’s drug law enforcement is SPD’s focus on crack cocaine—to the
virtual exclusion of other serious drugs such as heroin, powder cocaine,
ecstasy, and methamphetamine.155 In 2005 to 2006, nearly three-quarters
(74.1%) of all planned arrests for delivery of a serious drug involved
crack cocaine, a pattern that has remained consistent over time.156 Of
those individuals arrested for crack-cocaine delivery, 73.4% were
black.157 By contrast, less than 20% of those arrested for delivering any
other serious drug were black.158
The overrepresentation of crack-cocaine offenders among drug arrestees does not appear to be a function of public health and safety concerns, nor of resident complaints.159 Powder cocaine and ecstasy—not
crack cocaine—are the most widely used serious drugs in Seattle.160 Although crack-cocaine use poses health risks, it is less likely than other
serious drugs, such as heroin and other opiates, to be associated with infectious disease and drug-related mortality.161 Moreover, those arrested
for crack-cocaine offenses are the least likely among serious drug users
to possess a dangerous weapon at the time of arrest.162 Lastly, there is
little geographic correlation between the areas identified by civilian

152. BECKETT, supra note 14.
153. See id. (using multiple data sources, such as questionnaires and surveys, police reports,
and live observations).
154. Id.
155. BECKETT, supra note 14, at 48.
156. Id. (based on a four-month sampling period of May and June in 2005 and 2006); see also
Beckett et al., Race, Drugs, and Policing, supra note 64, at 123–24.
157. BECKETT, supra note 14, at 2.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 3; see also Beckett et al., Race, Drugs, and Policing, supra note 64, at 129; Beckett
et al., Lessons from Seattle, supra note 64, at 430–35.
160. BECKETT, supra note 14, at 20–21.
161. Id. at 433–34.
162. Id. at 433; see also BECKETT, supra note 14, at 96.
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complainants and the places where planned drug-delivery arrests occur.163
We believe that a less harmful approach to drug law enforcement is
necessary. Community-based diversion programs provide a viable alternative to traditional drug law enforcement methods.164 A more equitable
enforcement of drug laws would immediately begin to address racial disproportionality, especially when illicit drug use is roughly equal for each
racial or ethnic group.
7. Drug-Related Asset Forfeiture Distorts Law Enforcement
Priorities in Washington State
Drug-related asset forfeiture is an important tool for law enforcement. Forfeiture laws reduce the incentive for financially motivated
crimes such as drug trafficking by removing the assets that help make
such activities profitable.165 Washington State allows local law enforcement agencies to retain 90% of the net proceeds from drug-related assets
seized, but the state requires that these funds be used “exclusively for the
expansion and improvement of controlled substances related law enforcement activity.”166
This allocation creates a conflict between a law enforcement agency’s economic self-interest and traditional law enforcement objectives.167
In particular, section 69.50.505 of the Revised Code of Washington creates a perverse dependence whereby law enforcement agencies rely on

163. BECKETT, supra note 14, at 88–91.
164. MELISSA BULL, JUST TREATMENT: A REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS FOR THE
DIVERSION OF DRUG RELATED OFFENDERS FROM THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 23–26 (2003).
165. The Washington State Legislature made several findings in 1989 when it was considering
the asset forfeiture law, including the following:
[D]rug-related offenses are difficult to eradicate because of the profits derived from the
criminal activities, which can be invested in legitimate assets and later used for further
criminal activities; and the forfeiture of real assets where a substantial nexus exists between the commercial production or sale of the substances and the real property will provide a significant deterrent to crime by removing the profit incentive of drug trafficking,
and will provide a revenue source that will partially defray the large costs incurred by
government as a result of these crimes.
Omnibus Alcohol and Controlled Substances Act, ch. 271, § 211, 1989 Wash. Sess. Laws 1266,
1298-99 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.505 note (2010)); see also United States v. Two
Tracts of Real Prop., 998 F.2d 204, 213 (4th Cir. 1993) (“One of the most potent weapons in the
government’s war on drugs is its ability to obtain the civil forfeiture of property that aids violations
of the drug laws.”).
166. WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.505(10). The remaining 10% of the net proceeds are deposited
into the state general fund. See id. § 69.50.505(9).
167. Eric D. Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, The Next Stage of Forfeiture Reform, 14 FED. SENT’G
REP. 76, 76 (2001).
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assets seized during drug investigations to fund their operations.168 This
dependence inevitably skews how law enforcement agencies allocate
their resources, and it affects operational decisions regarding whether to
target particular crimes and how to exercise discretion when making arrests.169 Legitimate goals of crime prevention are compromised when
salaries, equipment, and departmental budgets depend on how many assets are seized during drug investigations.170
Additionally, the standard of proof in Washington State for the government to successfully claim property through asset forfeiture is one of
the lowest in the country, and it is highly deferential to law enforcement.171 Section 69.50.505 requires only that a law enforcement officer
have “probable cause” to believe the property is linked to criminal activity in order to lawfully seize it.172 Making matters worse, circumstantial
evidence is sufficient to establish probable cause to seize a person’s
property.173 If a property owner challenges the seizure, the burden is only
slightly increased to a “preponderance of the evidence” standard.174 The
168. Cf. MARIAN R. WILLIAMS ET AL., INST. FOR JUSTICE, POLICING FOR PROFIT: THE ABUSE
CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE 12 (2010), available at http://www.ij.org/images/pdf_folder/other_
pubs/assetforfeituretoemail.pdf (noting that in a nationwide survey, hundreds of law enforcement
executives admitted that “civil forfeiture proceeds were a necessary budget supplement”).
169. Id. at 12–13 (“One consequence of giving law enforcement a pecuniary interest in forfeiture proceeds is that it can cause them to over-enforce crimes that carry the possibility of forfeiture
to the neglect of other law enforcement objectives. This makes basic economic sense; as the return to
enforcing certain crimes increases, one would expect law enforcement agencies to devote a higher
percentage of their resources to those aims.”); Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policing for Profit:
The Drug War’s Hidden Economic Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 35, 40 (1998) (“First, these [asset
forfeiture] programs have distorted governmental policymaking and law enforcement. During the
past decade, law enforcement agencies increasingly have turned to asset seizures and drug enforcement grants to compensate for budgetary shortfalls, at the expense of other criminal justice goals.
We believe the strange shape of the criminal justice system today . . . is largely the unplanned byproduct of this economic incentive structure.”).
170. Eric D. Blumenson & Eva S. Nilsen, Contesting Government’s Financial Interest in Drug
Cases, CRIM. JUST., Winter 1999, at 4, 5.
171. The highest standard is proof “beyond a reasonable doubt,” followed by proof upon “clear
and convincing evidence.” The lowest standard is “probable cause,” which is used in fourteen states,
including Washington. See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 168, at 22.
172. Rozner v. City of Bellevue, 784 P.2d 537, 540–41 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (Division I
concluding that initial seizure of property under Washington’s asset forfeiture law requires a showing of probable cause that the property was used for illegal narcotics activity), rev’d on other
grounds, 804 P.2d 24 (Wash. 1991); Escamilla v. Tri-City Metro Drug Task Force, 999 P.2d 625,
630 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (Division III concluding that property may be seized if law enforcement
has probable cause to suspect that the property in question was used in connection with illegal narcotics activity); Valerio v. Lacey Police Dep’t, 39 P.3d 332, 339 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (Division II
concluding the same).
173. Adams County v. One 1978 Blue Ford Bronco, 875 P.2d 690, 692 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994).
174. WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.505(5) (2010).
OF
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low evidentiary threshold is troubling because many property owners
whose assets are seized are never charged with a crime or are not convicted. Investigators at the Seattle Post-Intelligencer found that 20% of
people whose property is seized are never charged with a crime, and that
40% of the time there is no conviction.175 In fact, even in those cases
where charges are filed, the case is dropped 23% of the time.176
The evidence suggests that the combination of tremendous financial
incentives and limited property rights distorts drug-related priorities and
pressures police to make operational decisions to maximize perceived
financial rewards.177 Especially today, with budgets already stretched
thin, Washington’s police departments are increasingly dependent on
prosecuting the drug war to ensure their economic survival. Washington’s
drug-related asset forfeiture laws reinforce drug-related law enforcement
tactics that have a disparate impact on racial minorities.178 As discussed
above, two-thirds of those arrested for delivery of a serious narcotics offense in Seattle are black.179 Because a drug arrest automatically renders
much of a defendant’s property seizable, section 69.50.505 of the Revised Code of Washington has a disparate impact on defendants of color.
Furthermore, despite the substantial property interests involved, indigent defendants do not have a right to appointed counsel when challenging an asset seizure.180 Because indigent defendants tend to be people of color, minority property owners are at a distinct disadvantage and
bear greater risk that their assets will be liquidated.
We believe that Washington State’s drug-related asset forfeiture
laws can be greatly improved with three simple reforms. First, we urge
Washington State to end the direct profit incentive that allocates 90% of
the net proceeds from asset forfeitures to law enforcement agencies.181
So far, eight states have enacted reforms to end the direct profit incentive
in their drug-related asset forfeiture laws by placing forfeiture revenue
175. Sam Skolnik, Critics Target Drug Raid Seizures, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Dec.
13, 2001, at A1, available at http://o.seattlepi.com/frontpage/seattle_pima1x220011213.pdf.
176. Id.
177. See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 168, at 13 (“[T]his is not simply theory. Earlier research
found that in states where agencies get to keep the lion’s share of forfeiture proceeds, drug arrests—
which often have the potential of a related civil forfeiture—constitute a significantly higher percentage of all arrests.”); Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 167, at 78–79 (discussing how police have an
incentive to target buyers in reverse stings because it allows officers to seize the buyer’s cash).
178. Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 169, at 39–40 (noting that traditional drug-enforcement
strategy has “a self-perpetuating life of its own” because of the “lucrative rewards available to police
and prosecutorial agencies that make drug law enforcement their highest priority”).
179. BECKETT, supra note 14, at 1.
180. See WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.505 (2010). The statute provides only that a property
owner may be entitled to attorneys’ fees if the owner “substantially prevails” in a proceeding to
reclaim his or her property. Id. § 69.50.505(6).
181. Id. § 69.50.505(10).
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into a neutral account, such as education, drug treatment, or ideally, in
the general treasury of the city, county, or state government that oversees
the seizing agency.182 This single measure could cure the forfeiture law
of its most corrupting effects.183
Second, we recommend increasing the burden of proof required to
seize property. Requiring seizing agencies to demonstrate with “clear and
convincing” evidence that the assets seized were linked to criminal activity would help protect property owners from arbitrary seizures.
Finally, because of the important property interests at stake, we
suggest that indigent persons be provided with counsel when their assets
are seized. Providing counsel for indigent defendants would help protect
property interests that are often key to indigent persons’ livelihood.
As long as police agencies can expect a financial reward for asset
seizures, they will remain dependent on current tactics that have a disparate impact on racial minorities.
8. Racial Disparity in Traffic Enforcement
Since 2000, the Washington State Patrol (WSP) has collected data
on its traffic stops.184 WSP requires its troopers to maintain data for every
contact they have with a motorist, including whether the motorist is
stopped, searched, and cited, as well as the driver’s race and ethnicity.185
Studies based on this data have found no evidence of racial profiling or
any observable racial disparity in traffic stops.186 Although black, NativeAmerican, and Hispanic drivers are stopped at higher rates than white

182. See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 168, at 17. Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, and Vermont do not distribute any of the proceeds to law enforcement. Id.; see also Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 167 (discussing reform efforts around the country where voters have approved laws to end the “‘corrupting incentives’” of asset-forfeiture allocation (quoting United States v. Funds Held in the Name or for the Benefit of Wetterer, 210 F.3d 96,
110 (2d Cir. 2000))).
183. See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 168, at 14; Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 167, at 80–
81.
184. LOVRICH ET AL., 2003 WSP REPORT, supra note 63, at 22. We note that stops by local law
enforcement constitute the large majority of traffic stops that take place in the state. But very little
empirical data have been collected on the stop, citation, and search practices of these local law enforcement agencies.
185. See Clayton Mosher et al., The Importance of Context in Understanding Biased Policing:
State Patrol Traffic Citations in Washington State, 9 POLICE PRAC. & RES. 43, 45–46, 47–48 tbls.1
& 2 (2008).
186. Id. at 43–44.
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motorists, this appears to reflect differences in traffic violation rates.187
There is some racial disparity, however, in the outcomes associated with
these stops.
Citations are one such outcome. To assess whether higher citation
rates among drivers of color are attributable solely to differences in traffic law violation rates, researchers compared the number of alleged violations in WSP stops that did and did not result in citation.188 The results
indicate that black, Native-American, and Latino motorists were identified by WSP officers as having more traffic violations even in stops in
which officers did not issue a citation.189 This suggests that WSP officers
were not “piling violations on” minority drivers to justify issuing citations to them. Nonetheless, comparison of citation rates for drivers with
just one violation reveals some racial differences.190 Specifically, black,
Native-American, Latino, and Asian drivers with one traffic violation
were significantly more likely to be cited than white motorists with one
traffic violation in a total of thirty-six jurisdictions, but less likely to be
cited than comparable white drivers in just six jurisdictions.191
Additionally, researchers found that “race is clearly an important
factor influencing the likelihood of a search.”192 In particular, the data
show that black, Native-American, and Latino motorists are significantly

187. Many of the most frequent violations—such as driving with a suspended license or broken
taillight—occur when people cannot afford to pay traffic fines or repair their cars. Thus, higher
violation rates among drivers of color may reflect socioeconomic factors. See id. at 45–46, 48.
188. Id. at 46, 48–49.
189. Id. at 53–54 tbl5.
190. Id. at 51, 52 tbl.4.
191. The authors concluded that this difference “d[id] not indicate the operation of systemic
bias in citing minorities who have only a single violation recorded by the WSP.” Id. at 51. It is not
clear how the authors made this determination. Forthcoming research examines and critiques the
methodologies that Lovrich et al., supra note 63, employed in their 2007 report on the WSP. See
Mario L. Barnes & Robert S. Chang, Analyzing Stops, Citations, and Searches in Washington and
Beyond, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 673 (2012); Clayton Mosher & J. Mitchell Pickerill, Methodological Issues in Biased Policing Research with Applications to the Washington State Patrol, 35
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 769 (2012).
192. J. Mitchell Pickerill et al., Search and Seizure, Racial Profiling, and Traffic Stops: A
Disparate Impact Framework, 31 LAW & POL’Y 1, 15 (2009). We note that an overlapping group of
researchers, using data from WSP traffic stops between 2005 and 2007, employed a different methodology to analyze the disproportionate search rates to conclude that the differences were not indicative of discrimination. See LOVRICH ET AL., 2007 WSP REPORT, supra note 63, at 49–50. They state
that because the relative disproportionality between groups is the same difference in magnitude for
low- and high-discretion searches, that this reflects a lack of bias in searches by WSP. Id. (“We
come to this conclusion by comparing the likelihoods of high discretion searches to low discretion
searches, which suggest that officers do not act differently based on race when they have higher
levels of discretion.”). But their analysis and conclusions are subject to important methodological
criticism. See Barnes & Chang, supra note 191; Mosher & Pickerill, supra note 191.
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more likely to be searched once stopped than are white drivers.193 This
disparity exists in both low- and high-discretion searches, and it persists
after time of day and number of violations are taken into account.194
However, the “hit rate”—that is, the share of searches that result in seizures—is somewhat higher for whites.195 For example, high-discretion
searches of whites led to seizures 24.1% of the time.196 But the hit rates
for minority groups during high-discretion searches were all lower:
17.6% for Latinos, 22.1% for blacks, 18.1% for Native-Americans, and
22.4% for Asians.197 These findings suggest that minorities are subject to
a higher rate of searches as compared to white drivers, but that this higher rate is not warranted by any policing purpose because whites are more
likely to have items subject to seizure.
In short, WSP should be recognized as one of a few agencies studied nationwide that does not exhibit a pattern of disproportionate minority contact at the “stop level.”198 The data and evidence demonstrate,
however, that WSP officers are more likely to cite black, NativeAmerican, and Latino drivers with one violation than white drivers with
one violation.199 The evidence also shows that race is an important factor
influencing the likelihood of a search.200
9. Racial Disparity in Driving While License Suspended (DWLS) Cases
In many misdemeanor courts, Driving While License Suspended in
the Third Degree (DWLS 3) cases constitute at least one-third of the
caseload, and consume a dramatic percentage of misdemeanor court,
prosecution, and public defense resources in a time of severe budget
challenges.201 Currently, there are an estimated 100,000 DWLS 3 cases in

193. Pickerill et al., supra note 192. Other driver characteristics also influence the likelihood of
a search. See id. For example, females and older drivers are less likely to be searched than males and
younger drivers. See id.
194. See Pickerill et al., supra note 192, at 15, 19, 21.
195. Id. at 13 & tbl.3.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Mosher et al., supra note 185, at 53, 56.
199. Pickerill et al., supra note 192, at 51.
200. Id. at 13. We disagree with the authors’ interpretations and conclusions.
201. John B. Mitchell & Kelly Kunsch, Of Driver’s Licenses and Debtor’s Prison, 4 SEATTLE
J. FOR SOC. JUST. 439, 443, 460–61 (2005).
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Washington per year,202 many of which result from failure to pay a traffic
ticket or to appear in court for the ticket.203
The costs of prosecuting DWLS 3 cases are staggering. It is estimated that Washington’s statewide average cost of arrest is $334, cost of
conviction is $757, and cost per jail day is $60.71.204 Even though most
first-time DWLS 3 convictions do not result in jail time, many people are
jailed on the second or third offense or for failing to complete probationary requirements.205 The single largest factor responsible for driving up
the costs of the criminal justice system has been the increased incarceration rate since 1980.206 Even if the DWLS 3 cases proceed on the basis of
tickets and not arrests, and there is no actual jail time imposed, the costs
of prosecuting and defending those cases approaches $75 million annually.207 Worse still, this cost does not take into account the impact on individual defendants and their family.
Additionally, the evidence shows that this facially neutral policy—
treating driving while license suspended as a misdemeanor offense—has
racially disparate effects. Most people charged with DWLS 3 are poor. A
1999 Seattle study found that of 184 people with suspended licenses, the
average person had $2095 in unpaid fines and a monthly income of
$810.208 Because of economic status and police deployment decisions—
and possibly because of racial profiling in some situations—people of
color are more likely to have suspended licenses for failure to pay a ticket. For instance, in 2000, a Seattle Times investigation found that black
drivers in Seattle receive more tickets and are more likely to be cited for

202. JOANNE I. MOORE & DAVID K. CHAPMAN, WASH. STATE OFFICE OF PUB. DEF., DRIVING
WHILE LICENSE SUSPENDED 3RD DEGREE: SURVEY OF COURTS OF LIMITED JURISDICTION 1 (2008),
available at http://www.opd.wa.gov/TrialDefense/090602_DWLS3Survey.pdf.
203. Mitchell & Kunsch, supra note 201, at 443.
204. STEVE AOS ET AL., WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, EVIDENCE-BASED PUBLIC
POLICY OPTIONS TO REDUCE FUTURE PRISON CONSTRUCTION, CRIMINAL JUSTICE COSTS, AND
CRIME RATES 41 exhibit B.2 (2006), available at http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/06-10-1201.pdf.
Figures were adjusted for 2007 dollars utilizing the Implicit Price Deflator (GDP) rate; these computations were performed using the calculator at Samuel H. Williamson, Seven Ways to Compute the
Relative Value of a U.S. Dollar Amount—1774 to Present, MEASURINGWORTH (Mar. 2011),
http://www.measuringworth.com/uscompare.
205. See Mitchell & Kunsch, supra note 201, at 440–42.
206. WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN WASHINGTON
STATE: INCARCERATION RATES, TAXPAYER COSTS, CRIME RATES, AND PRISON ECONOMICS 4 &
fig.5 (2003), available at http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/SentReport2002.pdf.
207. This figure is based on the average cost of a DWLS 3 conviction ($757) and the estimated
number of DWLS 3 cases per year (100,000). See AOS ET AL., supra note 204; MOORE & CHAPMAN,
supra note 202.
208. MUN. COURT OF SEATTLE, PARTNERS IN SERVICE TO THE COMMUNITY 1999-2000, at 7
(2001), available at https://www.seattle.gov/courts/pdf/smcreport.pdf.
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defective headlights than are white drivers.209 In some misdemeanor
courts, there is no counsel available for indigent persons at first appearance or arraignment hearings, and in other courts, public defense attorneys are too overwhelmed with cases to provide meaningful assistance.
As a result, people of color are more likely to be charged with DWLS 3.
In response to this worsening problem, court-initiated relicensing
programs have arisen. These programs allow individuals to have their
license reinstated in exchange for continued payment on outstanding
fines.210 King County District Court, for example, schedules at least two
days per month in which an individual may enroll in the program.211 Participants have the option to perform community service at the rate of $10
for each hour worked.212 The district court holds are released once the
court receives written proof of community service hours performed.213
In addition, the program offers participation in work crews and
credit toward King County District Court fines at the rate of $150 for
every eight-hour day worked.214 Yet another option is to make a 10%
down payment on fines and monthly payments for the remaining balance.215 A community-based organization, Legacy of Equality, Leadership and Organizing, assists individuals with the process and refers them
to the relicensing program.216 These programs both entice the payment of
outstanding fines and reduce the costs of prosecution, public defense, and
jail associated with DWLS 3 defendants.217 The King County District
Court relicensing program is estimated to save two dollars for every dol-

209. Andrew Garber, Seattle Blacks Twice as Likely to Get Tickets, SEATTLE TIMES (June 14,
2000), http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=20000614&slug=4026674 (“A
Seattle Times analysis of more than 324,000 citations issued in the past five years also found blacks
get more tickets per stop than whites and are more likely to be cited for certain offenses, such as
defective headlights. For example, the number of tickets issued to blacks for blocking traffic is four
times the proportion of blacks in the driving population.”).
210. Cooper Offenbecher, DWS: A Ticket to Debtor’s Prison?, KING COUNTY B. BULL. (Apr.
2008), http://www.kcba.org/newsevents/barbulletin/archive/2008/08-04/article1.aspx; see also
Mitchell & Kunsch, supra note 201, at 463.
211. Offenbecher, supra note 210; Relicensing Program, KING CNTY., http://www.kingcounty.
gov/courts/DistrictCourt/CitationsOrTickets/RelicensingProgram.aspx (last updated Jan. 20, 2012).
212. Relicensing Program, supra note 211.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. LELO—LEGACY OF EQUALITY, LEADERSHIP & ORGANIZING, http://www.lelo.org (last
visited Dec. 31, 2011). The organization also conducts its own DWLS education programs. See id.
217. Offenbecher, supra note 210.
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lar spent.218 King County is not alone in its efforts to address this crisis.
Recently, the City of Spokane Prosecutor’s Office established a diversion
program for DWLS 3 cases that it believes will reduce the municipal
court criminal caseload by 35%.219
Because most people charged with DWLS 3 have their licenses
suspended for not paying a fine or for missing a court hearing, we believe that if these individuals had the means and the knowledge to navigate the court system, they could have their licenses reinstated. Local
prosecutors and courts should work with defenders and community
groups to establish precharging diversion and relicensing programs
where they do not now exist. Additionally, the legislature should amend
section 46.20.289 of the Revised Code of Washington so that drivers’
licenses are not suspended for failure to pay a ticket or attend a court
hearing.220
10. Summary
In conclusion, the evidence shows a wide variety of policies and
practices that facilitate racial disparity in Washington’s criminal justice
system. In the nine aforementioned areas—juvenile justice, prosecutorial
discretion, confinement sentencing outcomes, LFOs, pretrial release,
drug law enforcement, asset forfeiture, traffic enforcement, and DWLS—
research has revealed that race matters at various stages in the disposition
of criminal cases. Similarly situated persons are treated differently along
racial lines in the studied contexts. These findings raise serious concerns
regarding other criminal justice contexts yet to be examined, and they
demonstrate how structural racism can and does affect outcomes in
Washington’s criminal justice system.
C. Bias
Many of us harbor explicit and implicit racial biases, regardless of
our professed commitments to racial equality. If we have these biases,
how many of us will admit them to ourselves, let alone to others? Even
218. Id.; Corinna Harn, Chief Presiding Judge, King Cnty. Dist. Court, & Tricia Crozier, Chief
Admin. Officer, King Cnty. Dist. Court, Costs & Benefits of the King County District Court Relicensing Program, Presentation of Findings from a Study by Christopher Murray & Associates (May
12, 2004) (PowerPoint slides available at DEFENDER ASS’N, old.defender.org/files/archive/Relicen
sing_Presentation.ppt (last visited Dec. 31, 2011)).
219. Robert C. Boruchowitz, AM. CONSTITUTIONAL SOC’Y, DIVERTING AND RECLASSIFYING
MISDEMEANORS COULD SAVE $1 BILLION PER YEAR: REDUCING THE NEED FOR AND COST OF
APPOINTED COUNSEL 9 (2010), available at http://www.acslaw.org/files/Boruchowitz%20%20Mis
demeanors.pdf.
220. WASH. REV. CODE § 46.20.289 (2008), invalidated on other grounds by In re Nichols,
211 P.3d 462 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009), aff’d, 256 P.3d 1131 (Wash. 2011).
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then, how do we know if these feelings in fact affect our behavior? Finally, if we admit that these feelings can affect our behaviors, are there ways
to prevent racialized outcomes that are inconsistent with our shared
commitment to equality? This section explores evidence regarding bias,
the relationship between bias and behavior, and the potential for solutions to prevent racially disparate outcomes.
1. Explicit Bias as Reflected in Survey Data
One of the best sources of survey data on racial attitudes comes
from the General Social Survey conducted by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago, which has collected data
from face-to-face surveys since 1942.221 The survey has revealed, over
time, that white attitudes toward blacks, as measured by expressed principles, have shifted dramatically. For example, in 1964, 60% of white
respondents were in favor of laws against intermarriage between blacks
and whites.222 By 2002, the number had dropped to 10% in favor of such
laws, though 35% still opposed intermarriage between whites and
blacks.223 Similar trend data show that when white respondents were
asked in 1977 about black inequality and its causes, 27% reported that it
was due to blacks having less ability.224 By 2006, this number had
dropped to 7% and, by 2010, it had settled at 9%.225 Interestingly, in
1977, 66% of white respondents asked about black inequality stated that
blacks lack motivation.226 In 2008, 52% of white respondents said that
blacks had no motivation and 60% agreed somewhat or strongly that
blacks should try harder.227 Some negative views, such as the attribution
of no motivation, seem to persist at a very high rate. It is also worth noting that a large percentage of white respondents believe that blacks are

221. HOWARD SCHUMAN ET AL., RACIAL ATTITUDES IN AMERICA: TRENDS AND
INTERPRETATIONS 59 (rev. ed. 1997).
222. Id. at 106 tbl.3.1B.
223. Compare id., with 2011 Update to Table 3.1B of Racial Attitudes in America: Trends and
Interpretations, INST. OF GOV’T & PUB. AFFAIRS (Oct. 2011), http://igpa.uillinois.edu/system/files/
Trends%20in%20Racial%20Attitudes_3-1B.pdf.
224. SCHUMAN ET AL., supra note 221, at 156–57 tbl.3.4A.
225. 2011 Update to Table 3.4A of Racial Attitudes in America: Trends and Interpretations,
INST. OF GOV’T & PUB. AFFAIRS (Oct. 2011), http://igpa.uillinois.edu/system/files/Trends%20in%20
Racial%20Attitudes_3-4A.pdf.
226. SCHUMAN ET AL., supra note 221, at 156–57 tbl.3.4A.
227. 2011 Update to Table 3.4A of Racial Attitudes in America: Trends and Interpretations,
supra note 225.
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treated unfairly by police, with 36% holding this view in both 1997 and
2007.228
The survey data show a significant diminishment in white negative
racial attitudes toward blacks in many areas, but even this outcome
should be taken with a grain of salt. Any survey is subject to the problem
of response bias.229
2. Implicit Bias Distorts Decisions Throughout the
Criminal Justice System
a. Overview on Implicit Bias
The criminal justice system involves numerous actors—such as police officers, prosecutors, judges, jurors, and eyewitnesses—whose decisions and judgments have a significant impact on the conviction and punishment of criminal defendants. A great deal of research has shown that
race significantly affects the decisions and judgments of most people.
Some of this research has been conducted on particular actors within the
criminal justice system. For example, the research on bias tends to show
that a juror who associates blacks (as opposed to whites) with a particular
crime will be more likely to convict blacks (as opposed to whites) of that
crime on the same evidence.230 These biases are subtle phenomena that
have some influence in any given case, but which have their most substantial effects over time. Biased decision-making artificially inflates the
proportion of minorities in the criminal justice system, which likely creates more stereotypes and associations, thus resulting in a negative feedback cycle.
The research and studies discussed below are either wellrecognized meta-analyses231 or particular studies selected for their relevance, elegance, clarity, and methodological rigor. Unfortunately, much
of the research to date has evaluated race as a white-black dichotomy.232
228. 2011 Update to Table 3.4B of Racial Attitudes in America: Trends and Interpretations,
INST. OF GOV’T & PUB. AFFAIRS (Oct. 2011), http://igpa.uillinois.edu/system/files/Trends%20in%20
Racial%20Attitudes_3-4B-Sup.pdf.
229. Response bias can be produced by such things as question wording, question context, race
of the interviewer, and privacy. See SCHUMAN ET AL., supra note 221, at 78–79 (addressing the
wording of questions); Maria Krysan, Privacy and the Expression of White Racial Attitudes: A Comparison Across Three Contexts, 62 PUB. OPINION Q. 506, 525, 536 (1998) (addressing the privacy
effect); Cynthia Webster, Hispanic and Anglo Interviewer and Respondent Ethnicity and Gender:
The Impact on Survey Response Quality, 33 J. MARKETING RES. 62, 63, 70 (1996) (addressing the
race and ethnicity of interviewers and respondents).
230. See infra note 264 and accompanying text.
231. We use the term “meta-analysis” to mean an evaluation of large collections of similar
studies that is used to determine the general state of knowledge regarding a particular issue.
232. See, e.g., SCHUMAN ET AL., supra note 221.
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Nevertheless, the studies that have expanded the race evaluation to other
minority groups have tended to show similar results.233 Thus, no distinction between minority groups is drawn here, and further treatment of that
issue is beyond the scope of this report.
b. Implicit Biases Are Pervasive
Survey data often fail to reflect “true” attitudes, especially when
people wish to conceal their motives or if they have unconscious biases.
In one carefully designed experiment, researchers found that when offered a choice of two rooms in which movies were playing, people
avoided the room with a disabled person, but only when doing so could
masquerade as movie preference.234 This experiment and others like it235
suggest that if people can act in a biased matter with plausible deniability, they will do so.
The gap between true attitudes and what is expressed is exacerbated
by the problem of unconscious or implicit bias. Much of this research is
done in connection with the Implicit Association Test (IAT), discussed
below, which measures reaction times in response to certain visual stimuli.236 Other methodologies include testing subjects while “measuring cardiovascular response, micro-facial movements, or neurological activity.”237
The general findings, confirmed by hundreds of articles in peerreviewed scientific journals, are that “[i]mplicit biases—by which we
mean implicit attitudes and stereotypes—are both pervasive (most individuals show evidence of some biases), and large in magnitude, statisti-

233. Compare William A. Cunningham et al., Separable Neural Components in the Processing
of Black and White Faces, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 83 (2004) (comparing reactions to black and white
faces and finding bias in favor of white faces), and Nilanjana Dasgupta et al., Automatic Preference
for White Americans Eliminating the Familiarity Explanation, 36 J. EXPERIMENTAL & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 316 (2000) (comparing reactions to photos of black and white Americans and finding
implicit bias in favor of white Americans), with Jaihyun Park et al., Implicit Attitudes Toward ArabMuslims and the Moderating Effects of Social Information, 29 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 35
(2007) (comparing reactions to Arab and Muslim names and white names and finding strong bias in
favor of white names).
234. Melvin L. Snyder et al., Avoidance of the Handicapped: An Attributional Ambiguity Analysis, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2297, 2297 (1979).
235. Id. at 2304 (discussing bystander intervention experiments varying race of victim).
236. Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition:
The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464, 1464–66 (1998).
237. Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law,
58 UCLA L. REV. 465, 471 (2010) (footnotes omitted).
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cally speaking. In other words, we are not, on average or generally, cognitively colorblind.”238
c. Implicit Bias Research on Race and Crime
Individuals in our society generally associate minorities with criminality;239 they also exhibit implicit bias against minorities240 and display
divergent behavior in experiments based on the manipulation of race as a
variable (such as the race of a face in a photograph, the race of a character in a vignette, or even the race of an experimenter).241 Researchers
have shown that whites tend to exhibit relatively increased levels of activation in the amygdala—an area of the brain that is associated with emotional stimulation and fear—when presented with black as opposed to
white faces.242 This effect has been correlated with performance on the
IAT, which measures implicit conceptual associations and has been used
by researchers to measure implicit bias in individuals.243 The IAT presents individuals with words or images from two distinct dichotomies
(such as good-bad and white-black), asks individuals to sort the words
and images according to assigned pairings (e.g., hit one button for each
good word or black image presented, and hit another button for each bad
word or white image presented), and then measures the speed and accuracy with which the individuals are able to sort the paired concepts.
Whites generally exhibit implicit bias against blacks under the IAT.244
Namely, whites tend to exhibit less speed and accuracy when asked to
associate positive concepts with black (as opposed to white) faces or
names. In certain studies, the IAT in particular also has been correlated
with biased behavior and decision-making.245

238. Id. at 473.
239. Harris et al., supra note 127, at 241; see also infra notes 251–255 and accompanying text.
See generally Kelly Welch, Black Criminal Stereotypes and Racial Profiling, 23 J. CONTEMP. CRIM.
JUST. 276 (2007).
240. Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations,
94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 955–56, 957–58 tbls.1 & 2 (2006); see also infra notes 244–245 and accompanying text.
241. See discussion infra Part III.C.2.d−f.
242. Phelps et al., supra note 18, at 729–33.
243. See id.
244. Id. at 730–31; see also Greenwald et al., supra note 236, at 1474.
245. See Jeremy D. Heider & John J. Skowronski, Improving the Predictive Validity of the
Implicit Association Test, 9 N. AM. J. PSYCHOL. 53, 71–72 (2007) (examining the extent to which
IAT measures of racial attitudes predict social behaviors); Allen R. McConnell & Jill M. Leibold,
Relations Among the Implicit Association Test, Discriminatory Behavior, and Explicit Measures of
Racial Attitudes, 37 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 435, 440 (2001) (using IAT to measure intergroup prejudice between white and black undergraduates).
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Researchers have made other findings regarding mental associations of blacks with criminality. In one study, individuals primed246 with
crime-related concepts more quickly identified computer imposed “dotprobe[s]” on black faces than white faces.247 The individuals primed with
crime-related concepts also identified the dot probe more quickly than
their nonprimed counterparts,248 an effect that was replicated among a
group of police officers.249 Further, when asked whether faces “looked
criminal,” a racially diverse group of police officers judged black faces
to be much more criminal-looking.250
d. Criminal Investigations and Arrests Are Influenced by the Race of
Potential/Actual Suspects, and Often Are Based on a Faulty Application
of Majoritarian Cultural Norms
The racial component of a given case may influence judgments of
character and guilt, expectations of recidivism, and decisions to arrest
and charge. In one study, priming police and probation officers with
black-related concepts significantly influenced responses to race-neutral
vignettes of juveniles committing theft and assault.251 Specifically, the
officers were more likely to rate the juveniles negatively, to expect recidivism, and to recommend arresting the juveniles if primed with blackrelated concepts, such as “homeboy” or “minority.”252 Another study observed that white store employees were more likely to monitor and follow black (as opposed to white) customers who asked to try on sunglasses with a security sensor removed.253
Additionally, researchers have conducted many deadly force simulations in which subjects must decide quickly whether to shoot or not
shoot figures appearing on a screen who are carrying either a gun or an
246. “Priming” occurs when a subject is shown an image or word so quickly that the image or
word is not registered in consciousness, but nevertheless has a subconscious impact and affects
behavior. Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876, 880 (2004); Erin J. Strahan et al., Subliminal Priming and
Persuasion: Striking While the Iron Is Hot, 38 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 556, 556 (2001).
This is a common and accepted method of investigating underlying mental processes in the field of
social psychology.
247. Eberhardt et al., supra note 246, at 882–83.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 885–87.
250. Id. at 889.
251. Graham & Lowery, supra note 17, at 487–88, 494, 499.
252. Id. at 489, 491–97.
253. George E. Schreer et al., “Shopping While Black”: Examining Racial Discrimination in a
Retail Setting, 39 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1432, 1439 (2009).
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innocuous object (such as a wallet). Whites have been shown to commit
more errors regarding black (as opposed to white) target figures.254 Another such deadly force study was conducted at the University of Washington with similar results.255 This bias effect increased in one study
when subjects read newspaper articles involving black (as opposed to
white) criminals prior to testing—once again showing the power of underlying stereotyping.256
Researchers have also studied whether nonverbal cues used by police officers to identify likely suspects, such as eye contact and body language, are accurate across races.257 Research has shown that minorities—
including minorities who have not been engaging in criminal activity—
disproportionately exhibit many of these nonverbal cues (such as pauses
in speech or avoidance of eye contact).258 These same behaviors also
have been shown in foreign language speakers.259
e. Determinations of Guilt and Sentencing Likely Are Influenced by the
Race of Defendants, in Conjunction with Other Extra-Legal Factors
Researchers have conducted some substantial meta-analyses regarding mock juror studies involving race. In these studies, subjects are provided with trial materials and asked for judgments of guilt and sentencing, and defendant race is manipulated. These studies are limited in various ways—for example, they generally evaluate individual mock jurors,
as opposed to mock juries engaged in group decision-making—but they
appear useful nonetheless.
One meta-analysis focused on sentencing decisions made by white
mock jurors found a narrow racial bias in sentencing against people of
color.260 Another meta-analysis evaluated verdict and sentencing decisions made by mock jurors (including black mock jurors) in mock cases
involving minority defendants, finding no significant effect of racial bias
(although there were apparent effects within particular types of crime).261
A subsequent meta-analysis collected more studies and evaluated the effect of out-group bias, including bias by black mock jurors against white
254. Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer’s Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to Disambiguate
Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1314, 1325 (2002).
255. Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Targets of Discrimination: Effects of Race on Responses to
Weapons Holders, 39 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 399, 399–402 (2003).
256. Joshua Correll et al., The Influence of Stereotypes on Decisions to Shoot, 37 EUR. J. SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1102, 1114 (2007).
257. Engel & Johnson, supra note 17; Johnson, supra note 17, at 280, 286.
258. Engel & Johnson, supra note 17, at 612 tbl.3.
259. Id. at 613.
260. Sweeney & Haney, supra note 17, at 191–93.
261. Mazzella & Feingold, supra note 17, at 1325.
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mock defendants.262 That meta-analysis found a “small, but significant”
effect of race on mock juror verdict and sentencing decisions, which was
substantially tempered both by jury instructions and use of binary responses regarding guilt (guilty or not guilty, as opposed to a scale measuring likelihood of guilt).263 These tempering conditions are more realistic and reflective of actual courtroom processes, and thus, based on mock
juror research to date, the effect of racial bias on jury decisions in general
appears to be fairly insignificant.
However, subsequent research has shown that race may play a significant role in particular types of criminal cases, or when combined with
other factors. For instance, some studies have found a substantial effect
of racial bias for crimes stereotypically associated with a particular
race—for example, relatively higher guilty ratings for whites charged
with embezzlement or blacks charged with motor vehicle theft.264 Another study evaluated the interaction of defendant race, socioeconomic status, and attorney race on mock juror evaluations. Although no factor was
individually significant, the three factors combined were highly significant; all else being equal, the Mexican, poor defendant with a Mexican
attorney was judged guilty by 55% of jurors, while the white, rich defendant with a white attorney was judged guilty by only 32% of jurors.265
f. Cross-Racial Eyewitness Identification Is Substantially Less Accurate,
and Cross-Racial Lineup Construction Is Less Fair
The “cross-race bias” eyewitness phenomenon is the finding that
“[e]yewitnesses are more accurate when identifying members of their
own race than members of other races.”266 In a survey of sixty-four eminent experts on eyewitness research, 90% agreed that the cross-race bias
phenomenon is reliable enough to be presented in court.267 Further, a
262. Tara L. Mitchell et al., Racial Bias in Mock Juror Decision-Making: A Meta-Analytic
Review of Defendant Treatment, 29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 621, 621 (2005).
263. Id. at 629.
264. Randall A. Gordon et al., Perceptions of Blue-Collar and White-Collar Crime: The Effect
of Defendant Race on Simulated Juror Decisions, 128 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 191, 195 (2001); Christopher S. Jones & Martin F. Kaplan, The Effects of Racially Stereotypical Crimes on Juror DecisionMaking and Information-Processing Strategies, 25 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 5–7, 9
(2003).
265. Russ K. E. Espinoza & Cynthia Willis-Esqueda, Defendant and Defense Attorney Characteristics and Their Effects on Juror Decision Making and Prejudice Against Mexican Americans, 14
CULTURAL DIVERSITY & ETHNIC MINORITY PSYCHOL. 364, 367–68 tbls.1 & 2 (2008).
266. Saul M. Kassin et al., On the “General Acceptance” of Eyewitness Testimony Research:
A New Survey of the Experts, 56 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 405, 408 tbl.1 (2001).
267. Id. at 407, 410.
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comprehensive and well-regarded meta-analysis of studies regarding
cross-racial eyewitness identification found that cross-racial identifications are 1.56 times more likely to be erroneous than same-race identifications.268 Considering the important role that eyewitness testimony
plays in criminal trials, this incongruity is disturbing. Similarly, another
study found that cross-racial lineup constructions (lineups constructed by
individuals of a different race than the suspect) are likely to be done with
less time and attention to detail in selecting foils and are therefore less
fair.269
3. Bias and Outcomes
Research also demonstrates that bias, whether conscious or unconscious, affects behaviors. In one study, résumés were sent to 1250 employers who had advertised that they were hiring.270 The résumés were
altered so that some résumés had stereotypically white-sounding names
while others had stereotypically black-sounding names. Each prospective
employer received four résumés from the researchers: “an average white
applicant, an average black applicant, a highly skilled white applicant,
and a highly skilled black applicant.”271 Much to the surprise of the researchers,
the résumés with white-sounding names triggered 50 percent more
callbacks than résumés with black-sounding names. Furthermore,
the researchers found that the high-quality black résumés drew no
more calls than the average black résumés. Highly skilled candidates with white names got more calls than average white candidates, but lower-skilled candidates with white names got many more
callbacks than even highly skilled black applicants.272

While this study involved fictitious black and white applicants in an
employment setting, its implications are of significant concern for the
criminal justice system, where a significant body of research has confirmed the presence of bias and disparate outcomes.
A difficulty remains, though, with connecting bias to behavior to
particular outcomes. Absent an admission from an officer who was motivated by bias, blacks, Latinos, and Native-Americans who are stopped
268. Christian A. Meissner & John C. Brigham, Thirty Years of Investigating the Own-Race
Bias in Memory for Faces: A Meta-Analytic Review, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 3, 15 (2001).
269. John C. Brigham & David J. Ready, Own-Race Bias in Lineup Construction, 9 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 415, 422–23 (1985).
270. Shankar Vedantam, See No Bias, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2005, at W12, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A27067-2005Jan21.html.
271. Id.
272. Id.
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and searched while driving their cars cannot prove discrimination. Yet
more blacks, Latinos, and Native-Americans are searched, even though
statistically, those individuals are less likely to be in possession of narcotics.273
Because of the cumulative effect of facially neutral policies that
have disproportionate impacts, and because of the subtle operation of
bias at various decision points, a disproportionate number of people of
color in Washington State find themselves incarcerated or otherwise involved with the criminal justice system—a disproportion that cannot be
fully accounted for by involvement in crime.
Further, due to the difficulties in proving intent and the limits of
current antidiscrimination laws,274 many of the solutions to the problem
of bias in the criminal justice system will have to come from outside of
the courtroom. The research shows that implicit racial bias is not an unavoidable component of human decision-making. Substantial research has
begun to determine the most effective methods of minimizing such bias.275 Implicit-bias research should inform policymaking and training
within the criminal justice system, albeit with great care and consideration.276
IV. CONCLUSION
A time comes when silence is betrayal.
—Martin Luther King, Jr., 1967
There is a problem in our justice system.

273. Pickerill et al., supra note 192, at 13 tbl.3.
274. Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Remembering How to Do Equality, in THE
CONSTITUTION IN 2020, at 94, 94–99 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009).
275. See, e.g., Sophie Lebrecht et al., Perceptual Other-Race Training Reduces Implicit Racial
Bias, PLOS ONE, Jan. 2009, at e4215, at 1, 4–5 (concluding that training in distinguishing other-race
faces decreases bias shown in IAT); Nilanjana Dasgupta & Anthony G. Greenwald, On the Malleability of Automatic Attitudes: Combating Automatic Prejudice with Images of Admired and Disliked
Individuals, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 800, 803, 804 fig.1 (2001) (concluding that exposure to images of liked and disliked members of racial groups affects performance on IAT).
276. See, e.g., Dale Larson, A Fair and Implicitly Impartial Jury: An Argument for Administering the Implicit Association Test During Voir Dire, 3 DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST. 139, 169 (2010)
(“[M]ake the IAT universal in jury assembly rooms . . . and test jurors for the categories most likely
to generate bias that could play a role in the cases scheduled for the day . . . .”); Gary L. Wells &
Elizabeth A. Olson, The Other-Race Effect in Eyewitness Identification: What Do We Do About It?,
7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 230, 241–43 (2001) (suggesting more lineup foils and own-race lineup
construction in cases of other-race eyewitness identification).
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In this Report, we find that race and racial bias affect outcomes in
the criminal justice system and matter in ways that are not fair, that increase disparity in incarceration rates, that do not advance legitimate
public safety objectives, and that undermine public confidence in our
criminal justice system. We have presented evidence of racial and ethnic
disproportionality and disparities in the criminal justice system. Arrest
and conviction rates do not correlate precisely with criminal behavior
rates and cannot serve as a proxy for criminality. Much of the disproportionality cannot be explained by legitimate race-neutral factors.
Put simply, we have found disparity and mistrust. Together, we
must fix it for the sake of our democracy.
Our democracy is based on the rule of law and faith in the fairness
of the justice system. This faith is undermined by disparity and by highprofile incidents of violence toward people of color by law enforcement.277 The problem is not a “people of color” problem. It is our problem as a society to address.
We, the Task Force on Race and the Criminal Justice System, are
devoted to reducing racial disparity in the justice system. Existence
would be intolerable were we never to dream. We dream of completely
eliminating bias in criminal, civil, juvenile, and family law matters. But
there is a long history of overpromising and underdelivering. We ask that
you join us with energy and goodwill, so we are not added to this list of
failures. We prefer the folly of enthusiasm to the indifference of wisdom
from those who purport to know better.
We ask that you trust only action because progress happens at the
level of events, not of words. Please join our effort to address bias in the
justice system at every level. We have hope because we are united and
committed to working collaboratively despite our differences. We celebrate the efforts of this Task Force to work together to build a community
based on trust, equality, and respect.

277. Steve Miletich, SPD Officer Charged with Assault in Videotaped Kicking, SEATTLE
TIMES (Apr. 13, 2011), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2014766865_officercharg
ed14m.html.

